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ABSTRACT 
Law enforcement agencies are constantly challenged by a changing threat 
environment, and they attempt to meet the challenges with the resources they have. In the 
past twenty years, terrorism is a dangerous threat to America while community 
expectations to address crime have also grown. Americans rely on local, state, and federal 
law enforcement to understand this threat and to incorporate counter terrorism efforts into 
their already full missions. In looking for the best ways to understand and combat the 
threat of terrorism, intelligence-led policing (ILP) has been offered as an effective 
strategy to improve police effectiveness. This thesis studies the ILP practices of two 
police departments—Metro Nashville and Chicago—and analyzes those elements of their 
strategies that contribute to successful ILP. This analysis validates the elements of the 3i 
model of effective ILP operations, and emphasizes several other elements as critical 
strategic elements necessary for an agency to develop and implement a successful ILP 
strategy. ILP is an effective policing strategy and the critical strategic elements identified 
in this thesis should serve as the foundation of efforts to build capacity in an agency. This 
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I. INTRODUCTION: A CALL FOR CHANGE 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Culminating with the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
since the mid-1990s and the subsequent global war on terror have focused much attention 
on the Intelligence Community’s (IC) ability to detect and prevent future attacks. The 
federal intelligence community has traditionally concerned itself with international 
threats to the security and sovereignty of the United States and not with domestic threats 
or issues. On the other hand, local police departments have generally concerned 
themselves with local crime issues with little or no consideration for national security 
issues. With more than 700,000 police officers working in the United States, there is a 
need to extend intelligence capabilities to local jurisdictions.1  Local law enforcement 
agencies need to develop and apply a model intelligence structure to their organizations 
that will allow them to develop better situational awareness of both criminal and 
domestic and international terrorist threats in their communities. This ability should give 
law enforcement leaders the information and tools they need to be integrated into the IC, 
be more effective against crime, and better protect their communities against terrorism. 
While much has been written in recent years advocating increased intelligence capacity 
by local law enforcement, much work remains to study and identify effective practices 
and workable models.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Law enforcement decision-makers need to integrate and enhance the counter 
terrorism, intelligence, and crime prevention missions of the police agency to enhance 
public safety. The research question addressed by this paper asks, “What are successful 
applications of intelligence-led policing, and can aspects of these programs be 
generalized to a model for other agencies to follow to improve crime reduction and 
counter terrorism efforts?”  
                                                 
1 Timothy P. Connors and Georgia Pelligrini, eds., “Hard Won Lessons: Policing Terrorism in the 
United States,” Safe Cities Project (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, July 2005), 17. 
2 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The primary objective of this research is to provide information that will aide 
local law enforcement agencies wishing to improve their counter terrorism and crime 
fighting capabilities. To accomplish this, the following six objectives will be addressed. 
This thesis attempts to:  
1.   articulate the definition, role, and function of local law enforcement intelligence 
(Much has changed over the past 25 years, and many agencies have yet to 
integrate advanced concepts on intelligence into their operations.2);  
2.   increase understanding of the promising concept of intelligence-led policing (ILP) 
and establish it as an important and effective tool for reducing crime and fighting 
terrorism;   
3.   present and explain the 3i model of effective ILP programs (This framework will 
be used to compare against working ILP models in an attempt to capture and 
validate the elements of the model);  
4.   identify effective ILP practices from working examples and identify the factors 
that make them successful (Achieving this objective will come from a review of 
ILP in three countries and an in-depth look at the intelligence-led practices of 
police departments in two major U.S. cities. This will lead to conclusions on its 
effectiveness as a policing strategy in crime and terrorism prevention.);  
5.   offer a set of recommendations to guide jurisdictions in efforts to develop and 
implement ILP strategy in their operations;  
6.   offer suggestions for further research in this area of study.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will further the discussion of ILP as an important policing philosophy 
for terrorism prevention. The intention of this paper is to identify and attempt to validate 
certain organizational structures and operating processes required for successful ILP  
applications. Further, anecdotal evidence will be offered to demonstrate that ILP is 
indeed an effective policing practice for crime reduction and, by extension, terrorism 
prevention.  
These factors make this research significant to jurisdictions that are either trying 
to integrate counter terrorism into their mission or to improve crime reduction efforts. 
Police executives and elected officials should be very interested in a model that increases 
their ability to reduce crime and prevent terrorism, and potentially to do so within current 
                                                 
2 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: An Overview (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University, 2006), 14.  
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resources. Improving the intelligence capacity and performance of local law enforcement 
should be of interest to federal law enforcement and counter terrorism agencies. Their 
effectiveness is based in part on the amount and quality of information they collect and 
include in their analyses. By integrating local law enforcement into the intelligence 
community, police agencies can become much more effective at providing and using 
intelligence. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW  
There is a clear role for local law enforcement in counter terrorism and in the 
process of developing and sharing intelligence about terrorist threats. Calling police “The 
Discoverers,” Lanier reinforces the belief that police officers have unique skills and 
abilities that make them excellent collectors of relevant information. Through their 
training and on-the-job experiences, officers develop the ability to detect suspicious 
behavior.3   The presence of 700,000 officers on the streets and in the neighborhoods 
across America indicates the potential power of their use. Not only is there a role for 
local police, but it is critical to leverage these hard-earned core competencies.4  These 
include recognition and investigation of suspicious behavior, an understanding of local 
context, and physical interdiction of dangerous individuals or groups. 
There has been an evolutionary development in law enforcement that has placed 
increasing importance on proactive identification of threats and strategy development to 
reduce risks. As consideration is given to the role of law enforcement in the war on 
terrorism, a number of law enforcement-based organizing principles have been discussed 
as useful strategies to enhance law enforcement’s effectiveness in protecting their 
communities against terrorism.  
Community policing has been identified as an important tool for local police to 
prevent and pre-empt terrorism in communities, leading to a new term “homeland 
                                                 
3 Cathy L. Lanier, “Preventing Terrorism Attacks in the Homeland: A New Mission for State and 
Local Police” (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 30-33. 
4 Blair C. Alexander, Strategies to Integrate America's Local Police Into Domestic Counterterrorism 
(Dissertation, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 28-29.  
4 
policing.”5 Others cite the importance of community policing, but believe adaptations are 
necessary to improve its effectiveness against terrorism.6  Strong community ties and 
knowledge of the players and issues in neighborhoods have been identified as strengths 
of community policing. A benefit of this familiarity is increased citizen reporting of 
suspicious behaviors and improved ability of officers to identify suspicious behavior in 
communities. 
In his work, Problem-Oriented Policing, Herman Goldstein articulates a problem-
focused model of policing and outlines an analytical process for police to use.7  Police 
should focus on the identification of factors that foster crime and lawlessness in 
neighborhoods. By applying a problem-solving model, officers can craft strategies to 
eliminate the root causes of crime.8  This problem-solving relies on analysis to 
understand the nature and extent of crime and to craft individualized strategies to combat 
it. Problem-solving authority is pushed to low levels in the organization because of the 
line level officer’s familiarity with issues. The importance of this policing strategy is the 
relationship between analysis, criminal intelligence, crime analysis, and effective law 
enforcement operations.  
The practice of crime analysis by police agencies has evolved as well. Generally, 
police crime analysis looks for crime patterns or identifies offenders by analyzing crimes 
that have already occurred. These trends can take the form of “hot spot” locations, 
chronic offenders, or patterns of similar crimes. Cope writes that “essentially analysts are 
information translators, whose role is to review information and provide reliable 
intelligence in a practical and operational format.”9  Today, crime analysis consists of 
                                                 
5 Jose Docobo, “Community Policing as the Primary Prevention Strategy for Homeland Security at the 
Local Law Enforcement Level,” Homeland Security Affairs, 1, no. 1 (Summer 2005):  11. 
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/vol1/iss1/art4 (accessed March 4, 2006). 
6 David E. Dial, Enterprise Policing for the September 12th Era (Master’s Thesis, Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 42-57. 
7 Herman Goldstein, Problem Oriented Policing (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990), 80-98. 
8 The SARA model of problem solving advanced by Goldstein has officers Scan the environment for 
problems, Analyze them for root causes leading to the crime and disorder, Respond with strategies and 
tactics tailored to address the specific root causes, and Assess level of success. This will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter II.  
9 Nina Cope, “Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?” British Journal of Criminology, 
44, no. 2 (March 1, 2004): 188-203. 
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three essential functions.  The first is to assess the nature, extent, and distribution of 
crime to assist in the efficient and effective allocation of police resources. The second 
function is to provide investigatory support by identifying background information on 
suspects and victims, and the relationships of each. Finally, analysis works to provide 
insight into the conditions and criminals facilitating crime and disorder “so that 
policymakers may make informed decisions about prevention approaches.”10  This type 
of crime analysis works to enable proactive strategies to remedy the causes of crime.  
As opposed to the generally reactive nature of traditional crime analysis, criminal 
intelligence has been defined by an IACP model policy on criminal intelligence as 
“information compiled, analyzed, and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, 
or monitor criminal activity.”11 Definitional overlaps are seen between crime analysis 
and intelligence analysis because they both attempt to identify, anticipate, prevent, or 
monitor criminal activity. Carter opines that “while crime analysis deals with crime that 
has already occurred, intelligence analysis deals with threats,” or crimes that are likely to 
occur.12 
Compstat, or computer statistics, is a program first developed by the New York 
City Transit Police and then expanded on a large scale by the New York City Police 
Department in the 1990s. Compstat integrates crime analysis and intelligence analysis 
and uses the intelligence product to focus operations against identified crime perpetrators, 
patterns, and locations.13 Its use of electronic mapping of crime data was groundbreaking 
in its identification of crime problems and focusing resources against them. 
With intelligence-led policing, police not only look for patterns of crimes that 
have already been committed, but also try to identify emerging threats. This can be far 
more sophisticated than traditional crime analysis or Compstat-style mapping. By 
                                                 
10 Timothy Oshea and Keith Nicholls, Crime Analysis in America: Findings and Recommendations 
(Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Dept of Justice, 2003), 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=855; 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?field=pubdate&order=0&parent=0&item=118 (accessed May 13, 
2006), 8. 
11 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Model Policy: Criminal Intelligence (Alexandria, VA: 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2003), 1. 
12 David L. Carter, Email correspondence to author, May 13, 2006. 
13 Phyllis P. McDonald, Managing Police Operations: Implementing the New York Crime Control 
Mode–Compstat. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), 1-25. 
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focusing analysis on threats, analysts may be able to identify a variety of current and 
emerging patterns or threats. These could include narcotics, violent crime, gang, and 
terrorist threats. Intelligence-led policing can give local police the capacity to identify 
terrorist and criminal threats in their own community so they can implement preventive 
measures in partnership with state and federal authorities.14   
Authors of recent publications reach a similar conclusion that improved law 
enforcement intelligence is critical to protect cities and the United States from terrorist 
threats. These publications include the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, 
Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards, Fusion Center Guidelines, Law 
Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Agencies, Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing.  There is a gap in the 
literature, however, in that there is no specific model for implementation of these 
concepts at the local agency level. There are examples in the literature for analyst training 
standards and for a model records maintenance policy, but nothing that uses best 
practices and research to propose a framework to implement these concepts in a large law 
enforcement agency.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
1. Limitations of Research  
This research presents ILP as an effective law enforcement practice. It is, 
however, important to acknowledge the difficulty of making statements about causality. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to demonstrate with statistical certainty that the 
application of ILP directly reduces crime or the incidence of terrorism in communities. 
To do so would be complicated by a variety of factors, chief among them the fact that the 
causes of criminality and terrorist behavior are dependent on many social, psychological, 
political, and economic factors. Measuring whether a change in criminality or terrorism is 
caused by an application of ILP or some other factor would require controlled 
experiments or comprehensive statistical analyses, and studies that could control for 
                                                 
14 Christopher Cleary, “Strategy for Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection, 
Analysis, and Dissemination of Terrorist Information” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2006), 49-52. 
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different variables would be cumbersome and expensive. Therefore both the experimental 
and the statistical methods are impractical and unnecessary for the scope of this thesis.15   
2. Methodology 
Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence, theory, and common sense, coupled with 
criminological and psychological research, can guide us toward greater understanding of 
these issues and to an ILP model that effectively protects communities. The hypothesis of 
this research states that intelligence-led policing is an effective strategy for police 
agencies to improve their abilities to prevent crime and terrorism in their jurisdictions, 
and that certain key elements of a model can be identified for agencies to apply in 
developing their own programs. 
Elements of an effective ILP program will be drawn from a model advanced by 
Jerry Ratcliffe in an article for the Australian Institute of Criminology.16 Ratcliffe 
proposes the 3i model comprised of three structures and three processes necessary for 
successful ILP implementation. This research builds on that model by evaluating the 
degree to which these elements exist in case studies of two cities. This analysis forms the 
basis of the thesis. 
A comparative case study using controlled comparison will therefore be used to 
examine intelligence-led policing.17 The case study compares ILP efforts of the Chicago, 
Illinois, Police Department and the Metropolitan Nashville, Tennessee, Police 
Department and contrasts them against the 3i model to test the hypotheses of ILP. These 
departments were chosen for comparison because both have implemented new policing 
strategies that incorporate a form of ILP that is central to their strategy. The analysis of 
ILP as implemented in Chicago and Nashville allows for an examination of current 
practices and an analysis of the factors influencing the success of their efforts. Comparing 
the practices in Chicago and Nashville against the 3i model allows for conclusions to be 
                                                 
15 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Political Science 
Review 65, no 3 (September 1971): 682-693. 
16 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, Intelligence-led Policing, Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, 
Australian Institute of Criminology, no. 248 (April 2003): 3. http://www.aic.gov.au (accessed August 10, 
2006). 
17 Stephen Van Evera, “What Are Case Studies? How Should They Be Performed?” In Guide to 
Methods for Students of Political Science  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997): 48-88. 
8 
drawn about key elements of a successful ILP model. Understanding those elements can 
lead to recommendations for other agencies considering ILP as an organizing principle. 
G. OVERVIEW OF SOLUTIONS 
While intelligence-led policing has been in use for a number of years in some 
foreign countries, its adoption in the United States has been slow and inconsistent. Little 
has been written for agencies to follow in implementing the philosophy, and 
implementation efforts seem to have happened without following any set of established 
criteria. This thesis identifies a number of key strategic elements necessary to incorporate 
an ILP program in a law enforcement agency’s strategy. These include the necessity of 
structuring and adequately resourcing the intelligence and analysis components while 
developing sufficient intelligence capacity.  
9 
II. LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE AND 
INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter lays a foundation for understanding the key concepts associated with 
this thesis: intelligence, the intelligence cycle, and intelligence-led policing. After an 
introduction to these terms, an overview of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan is provided to familiarize the reader with the priority placed on the implementation 
of ILP.  To support the objective of this research in providing guidance for law 
enforcement agencies and fusion centers attempting to establish an ILP capability, a 
discussion follows of six factors necessary for successful ILP implementation. Advanced 
by Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe, the 3i model is used as the basis for the comparative analysis of 
ILP efforts. Finally, a brief discussion of the use of ILP in three countries is presented to 
provide context and give examples of working applications. 
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE 
To improve local, state, and federal law enforcement’s ability to prevent terrorism 
and reduce crime, a core recommendation developed during a post-9/11 summit by U.S. 
police chiefs was to “promote Intelligence-led Policing through a common understanding 
of criminal intelligence and its usefulness.”18  Before discussing the concept of 
intelligence-led policing, it is necessary to establish the foundations of intelligence 
generally.  
As a product, intelligence is information that is tailored to support decision-
making or operational action. In this broadest sense, “intelligence is knowledge and 
foreknowledge of cyber, criminal or national security threats and issues.”19  The 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) defines it similarly as “information 
compiled, analyzed and/or disseminated in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor 
                                                 
18 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for 
Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, State and Federal Levels (Washington, DC: Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, August 2005), 12. 
19 Michael G. Potts, FBI Intelligence Assessment Process (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, August 2003), 7. 
10 
criminal activity.”20  One of the more important goals of intelligence is to provide 
indications and warnings of attack or pending dangerous activity. All of these definitions 
emphasize the ways in which law enforcement gathers information and attempts to gain 
an understanding of threats and issues. As a process, then, intelligence is a series of 
actions, commonly referred to as the Intelligence Cycle, taken to generate this 
intelligence product.  
C. THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
The purpose of intelligence is to provide decision-makers with timely, relevant, 
accurate, and actionable intelligence products to make sound operational and strategic 
decisions. The intelligence cycle shown in Figure 1 is a useful construct to describe seven 
steps that are generally necessary to transform raw information into actionable, coherent 
intelligence. This model can oversimplify what actually occurs, but it generally describes 













Figure 1.   Intelligence Cycle22 
                                                 
 20 IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, Criminal Intelligence: Concepts and Issues Model 
Policy (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, June 2003), 1. 
21 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 54-
67. 
22 Some information for the discussion of intelligence cycle and the chart in the figure is adapted from 
lecture materials from the course, Intelligence for Homeland Security, Organizational and Policy 
Challenges, Robert Simeral (Monterey, CA: Center for Homeland Defense and Security Naval 
Postgraduate School, December 2005), Used with permission. 
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1. Identify Requirements  
Most agencies are unable to develop a deep understanding of every issue that 
presents a potential threat to their community. Operating with limited resources requires 
policymakers to establish priorities that allow for efficient resource deployment by 
focusing on the most dangerous, most common, or most important threats to their 
community. Policymakers must be concerned with low consequence/high frequency 
events such as auto theft or larcenies and with high consequence/low frequency events 
such as school shootings, civil unrest, or terrorist acts.23  By necessity, then, the 
intelligence cycle starts with a shifting set of requirements that establish which issues, 
targets, or areas receive priority. Depending on the threat environment, some issues 
receive great attention and full resources, others receive moderate attention, and some 
receive relatively little attention. The risk in operating in this manner is that there might 
be hidden or developing threats in the community that go undetected, but are still 
dangerous to public safety. This highlights the importance of setting real and accurate 
intelligence requirements and explains why setting them is the responsibility of 
policymakers. The requirements-setting process sets the operational tone of the agency by 
identifying which issues receive operational attention.  
2. Collection  
After identifying the requirements to establish agency and intelligence priorities, 
the next step is to collect relevant information on the targeted subjects or topics. The 
means of collection might be more or less technical, but the purpose is the same, 
regardless how the information is obtained. Information is collected to develop a greater 
understanding of the motives, capabilities, and intentions of the issues and subjects that 
present a risk to public safety. At this stage, analysts are interested in all potentially 
relevant information from a variety of sources.  
                                                 
23 This statement is not to imply that the costs associated with more common crimes such as auto theft 
or larcenies are inconsequential. Billions of dollars of loss each year are attributed to property crimes, and 
the U.S. economy suffers great loss of productivity due to victimization of violent crime. The aim of this 
statement is to highlight the tremendous loss of life, property damage, and psychological harm that results 
from some low frequency events like terrorism. This causes a situation where law enforcement leaders and 
elected officials cannot afford to ignore these incidents and must plan for them and attempt to prevent 
them. 
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The collection categories of the federal intelligence community have been well 
established over many years, and local law enforcement uses similar collection methods 
to a greater or lesser extent.  
Human intelligence is the method most widely used by local agencies. It comes 
from human sources such as informants, or perhaps tips from citizens or Crimewatch 
groups.24   
Signals intelligence comes from sources like intercepted cellular or landline 
phone calls or e-mail messages.   
Imagery intelligence is the use of visual imagery, and includes photographs, 
satellite images, and data from geographical information systems (GIS).  
Measurement and signature intelligence takes measurable readings, including 
radiation levels and concentrations of chemicals in the atmosphere.  
In an additional collection practice, local law enforcement relies heavily on 
information collected through interpersonal contacts with the public during the course of 
officers’ duties. Much valuable information is collected from traffic tickets, crime 
reports, and through investigatory stops. Technology has made it easier to collect and 
collate more information than ever before.  
Collection of information is not intelligence, however, and the ability to collect 
ever-increasing amounts of information can lead to a needle in the haystack problem. 
Also referred to as the wheat versus the chaff problem, valuable information must be 
separated from unimportant information and processed before analysts can yield any 
useful intelligence.25  
3. Processing and Exploitation 
To address the wheat-versus-chaff problem, someone must sort through mounds 
of information in search of useful intelligence, and repackage it in formats that are useful 
to analysts. This step in the intelligence cycle, sometimes referred to as “collation and 
                                                 
24 Crimewatch is a successful neighborhood-based crime prevention philosophy that partners with 
neighborhoods to provide education for citizens to monitor criminal and safety information in their 
neighborhoods. More information available at http://www.ncpc.org/ 
25 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 60. 
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evaluation,” ensures that the intelligence process has a steady flow of high quality 
information in a readily retrievable format.26 The collation and evaluation of raw 
information are critical functions, and they protect the agency against liability for 
collecting and storing illegal or improper information.27  
Collation refers to the review, indexing, and filing of information to sift out 
useless, non-relevant, or incorrect information.28 This process puts information into 
orderly arrangements so analysts can establish relationships between apparently 
disconnected elements. Through categorization of data, often with the use of computer 
databases, patterns and trends of criminal activity may become more obvious.  
The evaluation of information accepts that not all data collected are equal in terms 
of quality and relevance.29 Legal and ethical guidelines require that information 
maintained by law enforcement must be relevant, reliable, valid, and related to criminal 
activity.  Some information collected will reflect legal activity or associations, or may be 
otherwise irrelevant. The evaluation process ensures that only information pertaining to 
criminal activity or that represents a threat to the community are maintained in agency 
files.  
                                                 
26 Marilyn B. Peterson, “Collating and Evaluating Data,” in Intelligence 2000, Revising the Basic 
Elements, eds. Marilyn Peterson, Bob Morehouse, and Richard Wright (Sacramento, CA: Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Unit, 2002), 87-95. 
27 Two guidance articles are useful to agencies to ensure their intelligence files comply with federal 
guidelines. L.E.I.U. Guidelines, issued by the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit provide a set of 
guidelines on intelligence collection, evaluation, file creation, maintenance, and file purging. Code of 
Federal Regulations Title 28 (28CFR23.20) establishes criminal intelligence system operating policies that 
are required for any federal agency, or any agency that maintains intelligence files that are supported by 
federal funds. 
28 Peterson, “Collating and Evaluating Data,” 87-88. 
29 Ibid., 94. 
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4. Analysis and Production  
The IACP report on Criminal Intelligence Sharing simplifies the intelligence 









Figure 2.   Intelligence Development Process30 
 
Relevant, credible information comes from the first four steps in the intelligence 
cycle. Even after collected information has been screened for relevancy and packaged 
into accessible formats, it is not yet intelligence. The information must be subjected to the 
“quality analysis” indicated in Figure 2 before it will become useful intelligence. 
Analysis is the most important part of the intelligence cycle as raw information is 
converted into useful intelligence.31  Aspects of an analyst’s job include the processes of 
acquiring and summarizing data, extracting meaning from that data, and producing an 
accurate, relevant product.32   
To be valuable to its customer, analysis should answer four questions.33  
1. Who poses threats? (This identifies the persons, groups, or movements 
that pose a risk to public safety.) 
2. Who is doing what with whom? (This identifies and describes the 
relationships between conspirators or supporters of criminal and terrorist 
organizations.) 
                                                 
30 IACP, Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A National Plan for Intelligence-led Policing at the Local, 
State, and Federal Levels  (Washington, DC Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, August 
2005), iv. 
31 Robert Simeral lecture notes, see footnote 22 for course information (December 2005). 
32 Howard N. Atkin, “Intelligence Led Policing,” in Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements, 
ed. Marilyn B. Peterson (Sacramento, CA: Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, 2000), 13-21. 
33 David L. Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for Local, State, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies (Washington, DC: Michigan State University and the COPS Office, November 
2004), 150-152. 
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3. What is the modus operandi of the threat? (This tells how the criminal or 
terrorist enterprise operates. Information on targeting and attack methods 
would be included.) 
4. What is needed to catch offenders and prevent crime incidents? (This 
provides insight into potentially successful tactics or strategies that 
operational elements might employ.) 
Analysis is the process by which disjointed, unrelated information comes into 
focus and can be identified as the “dots.” When information is put into context and 
conclusions can be drawn from it, the “dots” can be connected.34  
5. Dissemination 
Once valid, relevant, timely, and actionable intelligence is developed by analysts, 
it must be disseminated to policymakers and other consumers. This dissemination can 
take several forms. Strategic or operational assessments would be distributed to 
policymakers so they can use them in making sound decisions. Tactical assessments 
affecting smaller, contained incidents or issues might be sent directly to the unit involved. 
Ideally, as will be discussed later in this paper, intelligence should be disseminated 
outside traditional law enforcement circles.  
Advances in technology allow for dissemination to take on increasingly adaptable 
formats. Dissemination is no longer limited to a hard copy intelligence report or 
informational bulletin. Secure web portals, email, listservs, and interactive content 
management systems are some of the ways information and intelligence can be shared. A 
large challenge facing decision-makers and the intelligence apparatus supporting them is 
one of volume. There is more information available than ever before, and officials at 
every level are barraged with information-sharing reports and assessments, to the extent 
that it has become white noise and is often ignored.35 This ability to overwhelm decision-
makers and others presents a huge challenge to analysts in that they must carefully craft 
products for dissemination that consider local context and are immediately valuable to the 
recipient. 
                                                 
34 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The FBI Intelligence Cycle: Answering the Questions, A Desk 
Reference Guide for FBI Employees,” cited in David Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence (November 
2004), 65. 
35 Lisa M. Palmieri, Information vs. Intelligence: What Police Executives Need to Know 
(Massachusetts: IALEIA, 2005). http://www.ialeaia.org/pubs/InformationvsIntelligence.pdf (accessed 
February 22, 2007). 
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6. Consumption  
Simeral notes that it is often taken for granted that policymakers will digest and 
act upon the intelligence they receive, but this is certainly not guaranteed. Policymakers 
might disregard or discount intelligence for many personal or professional reasons, and 
the efficiency and effectiveness that might otherwise be realized because of timely and 
accurate intelligence can be lost. It is necessary for policymakers to receive, digest, 
understand, and act upon the intelligence developed through the cycle in order to receive 
the intended benefits.  
7. Feedback  
Policymakers must evaluate the performance of their intelligence function and the 
products they produce, suggesting improvements and directing changes in requirements 
as necessary. This requires that they be fully engaged in the policy that controls the 
creation of intelligence and assessment of its accuracy and effectiveness. They should 
constantly reevaluate requirements to ensure that agency priorities reflect the most 
pressing threats. This will help ensure that the agency is not surprised by a crime trend 
that has developed unnoticed. 
D. MANDATE—THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
PLAN 
In the months following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, law 
enforcement leaders met at the annual International Association of Chiefs of Police 
conference and identified a need to address chronic weakness in the law enforcement 
intelligence process that contributed in part to the failure of preventing the attacks. The 
chiefs identified an absence of a national process for intelligence generation, difficulties 
in accessing necessary information, reluctance to share information, and deficits in 
analysis and technology. In response to the IACP’s recommendation, the Global 
Intelligence Working Group (GIWG) was formed and this new group generated the 
National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP).36  
                                                 
36 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Recommendation from the IACP Intelligence Summit, 
Criminal Intelligence Sharing (Arlington, VA: IACP, August 2002). 
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Foremost among the goals of the GIWG was to establish the importance of 
criminal intelligence, intelligence-led policing, and community policing. Their efforts 
focused on developing a capacity within law enforcement agencies to produce 
intelligence about threats in or to their communities, and then to apply that intelligence to 
operational and strategic decisions. GIWG’s goal was to educate police leaders on the 
facets of ILP and encourage its adoption as an integral part of each agency’s philosophy 
and operations. Further, the growth of the community policing concept in the previous 
decade had established that police have close and positive relationships with community 
members, giving officers “unfettered access to local, neighborhood information as it 
develops.”37  The participants identified the promotion of intelligence-led policing as 
core to achieving the goals of the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan. 
E. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING  
In intelligence-led policing (ILP) law enforcement takes the intelligence product 
and puts it to work. The concept is reflective of a significant change in the field of 
policing that has rapidly developed over the past twenty years.38  Against a backdrop of 
an exploding volume of complex data, accessibility to and scrutiny of police, and an 
increasingly agile, complex, and mobile criminal element, traditional reactive, random 
policing methods were increasingly seen as ineffective.39  Financial constraints and 
increasing demands on police for effectiveness, transparency, and efficiency have driven 
a shift to more intelligence-led philosophies.  
ILP causes a shift in the nature of policing from incident-driven, reactive practices 
to a more directed, proactive focus.  Most experts agree that ILP must be more than a 
policy or new method; rather, it must be a cultural change for law enforcement that is 
implemented agency-wide at every level of the organization.40  Agencies around the 
world have developed and adapted the concepts of ILP to put intelligence to use and 
improve the effects of their efforts. 
                                                 
37 U.S. Department of Justice, The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Washington, DC: 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, October 2003). 
38 Mike Maguire, “Policing by Risks and Targets: Some Dimensions and Implications of Intelligence-
led Crime Control,” Policing and Society 9 (2000): 316. 
39 Atkin, Intelligence Led Policing, 13. 
40 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide, 41. 
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There are two main factors in ILP. In the simplest terms, ILP is predicated on 
both the production and application of intelligence.41  Thus the first requirement of ILP is 
the generation of accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence. This would be developed 
in accordance with agency priorities through the process outlined in the previous section. 
The generation of this intelligence is useless unless the customer, in this case law 
enforcement, can effectively put the product to work. The second factor, therefore, is that 
the intelligence is used to lead police operations. Analytic products should be used to 
develop and guide strategy, operational planning, and actions that address crime and 
public safety problems. For example, the NYPD Crime Control strategy calls for a 
combination of “timely and accurate intelligence” and “effective strategies and 
practices.” Police resources and efforts are focused in locations and against persons 
determined to be a threat to public safety by police analysts through the intelligence 
analysis cycle.42  
As will be discussed in later chapters, ILP attempts to understand crime, 
criminals, and the threat of the next crime. Analysts not only look for patterns in crimes 
already committed, but they also try to identify emerging threats. If analysts are able to 
achieve a degree of predictive analysis, it is far more sophisticated than traditional crime 
analysis or simple information mapping, though all are used effectively in ILP 
applications. Analysts focus on threats (what might happen) instead of focusing 
exclusively on already committed crimes (what has happened). Analysts work to identify 
a variety of current and emerging patterns and threats.43    
1. Applications of Intelligence-Led Policing 
In recent years, agencies have attempted new and innovative approaches to 
incorporate this intelligence product into their operations. These applications have been 
widely discussed in law enforcement and academic literature. Whether they were 
acknowledged as a form of ILP or not, some key examples include:44  
                                                 
41 Atkin, Intelligence Led Policing, 13. 
42 McDonald, Managing Police Operations, 8. 
43 Ratcliffe, “Intelligence-led Policing,” 4. 
44 These examples, cited by Atkin in Applications of Intelligence, 14, are documented widely and in 
detail throughout law enforcement and academic literature. 
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• Pro-Active Policing shifts police activity from responding to proactively 
interdicting criminals. 
• Problem-Oriented Policing focuses on specific problems and finds 
specific solutions to address and prevent them. 45 
• Community Policing uses community-based programs and 
community/police partnerships to identify and solve problems. 
• Compstat involves computer generated crime statistics and mapping to 
identify crime threat locations to deploy resources. 
These approaches all share a reliance on intelligence and on intelligence-led 
methods. While law enforcement agencies have varying degrees of sophistication in their 
ability to develop quality and actionable intelligence, these examples demonstrate a broad 
acceptance. In the following sections, a brief description of these models will highlight 
applications of ILP. It is apparent that there are many similarities and overlaps among 
these policing strategies, and that the common thread among them is a basis in ILP. 
2. Pro-Active Policing 
As opposed to the traditional reactive posture of police operations, proactive 
policing is a generic term that refers to identifying potential crime problems and taking 
action to address them rather than waiting on a crime report before responding. An 
example of proactive policing took place in the early 1990s when the Houston (Texas) 
Police Department altered its policing strategy to a proactive stance it called Crime-
Specific Policing (CSP).46  
Based on a belief that law enforcement can impact crime not by addressing 
quality of life issues, but by arresting criminals and conducting aggressive, visible 
patrols, Houston experienced a significant drop in crime after implementation of the new 
strategy. This strategy requires the police to have some degree of analytical capability to 
identify crime areas in need of attention that have been called “hot spots.” This focus of 
police resources on areas identified as crime-prone is a central element of proactive 
                                                 
45 Description of some policing models are summarized by Nicole Billante, “The Beat Goes On: 
Policing for Crime Prevention,” Issue Analysis 38 (St. Leonards, New Zealand: The Centre for Independent 
Studies, July 2003), 2. 
46 Roy R. Roberg, et al., Police Management, 3d ed. (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury, 2002), 279. 
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policing.47 This is a relatively simple use of intelligence to identify crime hot spots and 
chronic offenders. The process of analyzing and identifying crime-prone locations, 
individuals, and times led to the emergence of the problem-oriented policing philosophy. 
3. Problem Oriented Policing  
In the 1990s, the problem oriented policing method took hold in many police 
agencies across the country.48 Its concepts provide police with a simple model to guide 
intelligence development and application called the SARA method.49  The acronym 
SARA stands for Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment.50  
Police first scan the environment for problems, often looking at reported crimes or 
geographic clusters incidents that caused police response. These problems are then 
analyzed in an attempt to determine the underlying causes and provide insight into an 
appropriate response. The response may involve using a variety of governmental and 
private resources based on the analysis, and is not limited to a police-only solution. 
Finally, feedback and a review of results contribute to an assessment of the degree to 
which the problem is improved. The response can be altered based on this assessment to 
increase effectiveness. Problem oriented policing does generally use intelligence and 
problem identification, but it usually focuses on specific problems and specific solutions 
to address them.51  
The crime triangle, or problem-analysis triangle, is a way of understanding crime 
problems that is used by police in their analyses.52 The model is based on the idea that for 
a successful crime to occur, three elements are required: a vulnerable victim, a motivated 
perpetrator, and the two together in a suitable location at the same time. If any element of 
                                                 
47 Loreen Wolfer, “Problem-Solving Policing: Eliminating Hot Spots,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 
(November 1999): 1. 
48 Goldstein, Problem Oriented Policing, 32-49. 
49 Problem Oriented Policing and the SARA method have been widely documented in academic and 
law enforcement literature. The discussion here is from the author’s recollection and training materials 
provided by the Indianapolis Police Department in the early 1990s. 
50 Wayne W. Bennett and Karen M. Hess, Management and Supervision in Law Enforcement, 3d ed. 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), 131. 
51 Billante, “The Beat Goes On: Policing for Crime Prevention,” 6. 
52 Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, “The Problem Analysis Triangle,” 
http://popcenter.org/about-triangle.htm (accessed February 11, 2007). 
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the triangle is absent, the crime cannot occur. This idea has given law enforcement a 
conceptual framework for problem solving. The theory is that if police target repeat 
offenders, repeat locations (hot spots or geographic clusters of incidents), or repeat 
victims, they can produce viable crime reductions.53 One way of doing so is to ensure 
that there is a capable guardian to protect the vulnerable victim, a manager to protect the 
place, and a handler to prevent the offender from committing the criminal act. Protecting 
the location can be achieved through means such as police patrols, neighborhood watch 
programs, door locks, surveillance cameras, or security guards.54 The police focus on 
repeat offenders and repeat victims in order to reveal patterns, individuals, and activities 
that might be targeted to prevent crime. 
Goldstein recommended that police consider a range of potential alternative 
solutions once problems are identified.55 These solutions may involve resources from 
other government agencies and private and community resources. This non-police 
approach to solving problems was a considerable break from traditionally reactive 
approaches.  
4. Community Policing  
The community policing philosophy accepts that the police are not the sole 
guardians of law and order, and it incorporates the public as an active partner to identify 
and solve community problems.56 Community policing is proactive and uses problem-
solving, thus it builds upon the other proactive and problem-solving approaches already 
described. But community policing also incorporates community cooperation and 
participation. Though implementation of community policing varies widely, two key 
elements are generally universal: police-citizen interaction and cooperation, and problem-
solving efforts to reduce crime-related community problems. Police work to establish 
working relations with community groups and neighborhoods, and they work with them 
to establish a consensus about the crime-related problems that the community identifies 
                                                 
53 Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, “The Problem Analysis Triangle.” 
54 Home Office, Routine Activity Theory, http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/skills/skills08.htm 
#guardian (accessed February 11, 2007). 
55 Goldstein, Problem Oriented Policing, 102. 
56 Roberg, et al., Police Management, 58-59. 
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as most important. Police value the community’s needs and prioritize their work to 
address these needs. The problem-solving efforts work to reduce the problems that the 
community has identified through its work with the police. This means that police may 
find themselves spending more time enforcing quality of life problems such as noise 
violations and truancy than they otherwise might have. This collaboration between the 
police and community to identify and solve community problems has been called 
democracy in action as it involves citizen involvement in the determination of police 
resource allocation.57 
5. Compstat 
In the mid 1990s, the New York City Police Department implemented its 
intelligence-led crime control strategy called Compstat, or computer-driven crime 
statistics.58  With obvious roots in the SARA method, NYPD’s implementation rests on 
five basic principles: 
1. specific objectives, 
2. timely and accurate intelligence, 
3. effective strategies and tactics, 
4. rapid deployment of personnel and resources, 
5. relentless follow-up and assessment. 
Compstat decentralized responsibility and authority for crime reductions while 
creating a centralized intelligence and analytical support capability. NYPD has 
successfully integrated the application of intelligence into nearly every aspect of its 
operation and reinvented itself as one of the most effective police agencies in the country. 
Six key elements of COMPSTAT-like programs have been identified after a 
review of a number of departments.59  
1. Mission clarification: The agency’s crime fighting mission is clarified to 
focus efforts. 
                                                 
57 Bureau of Justice Assistance, Understanding Community Policing: A Framework for Action 
(Washington DC: BJA, 1994), 4.  
58 McDonald, Managing Police Operations, 8. 
59 James J. Willis, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd, “COMPSTAT and Bureaucracy: A 
Case Study of Challenges and Opportunities for Change,” Justice Quarterly 21 (September 2004): 463-496. 
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2. Internal accountability: Processes are put in place to measure police 
activities and their impact on crime. 
3. Geographic organization of operational command: Operational 
commanders are given responsibility and authority over patrol officers and 
special units within an area, and are held accountable for their efforts. 
4. Organizational flexibility: Commanders retain flexibility of their resources 
to direct them against identified problems. 
5. Data-Driven analysis of problems and assessment of problem-solving 
efforts: This provides a semi-scientific assessment of crime problems and 
underlying causes, and the effectiveness of police efforts. 
6. Innovative problem-solving tactics: The organization picks problem-
solving tactics because they have the highest probability of success. 
There is recognition that what works in New York may not work in other places. 
The principles of ILP may remain the same, but local factors can limit the universality of 
any ILP approach. As will be shown in later chapters, there is flexibility in applying the 
principles of ILP to local needs to provide the most effective policing. 
6. Catching Terrorists with ILP 
The success of a police department is often measured by using official statistics of 
reported crimes over a period of time. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Report program indexes 
crime in several categories and is commonly used as a barometer of agency 
effectiveness.60 This is a measure of crimes that have already occurred, however. In 
considering terrorism, success must not be determined by measures such as successful 
prosecutions of terrorists after an attack or a UCR-like count of incidents. Success must 
be measured by a lack of attacks, by prevention of attacks before terrorists have a chance 
to carry out their plans.  
Terrorism has presented a new threat to American law enforcement requiring new 
practices and partnerships to combat and defeat. Establishing the national doctrine for 
protecting America against terrorism, the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
defines terrorism as “any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public 
welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or governments.”61 
                                                 
60 FBI, UCR FAQ (Washington DC: FBI, 2006), http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ucrfaq.pdf, (accessed 
December 17, 2006). 
61 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC, July 
2002), 2. 
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This definition of terrorism as unlawful behavior places terrorist activities in the realm of 
behaviors police must address. The potential for substantial death, injury, and property 
damage requires that law enforcement at every level of government consider prevention 
and interdiction of terrorist activities a priority.  
Despite skepticism during the past couple decades, researchers today are 
concluding that police do matter, and that they can reduce crime and increase safety in 
communities.62 Law enforcement cannot focus only on incidents that occur with high 
frequency, but must also attempt to prevent and prepare for the occurrence of low 
frequency/high impact occurrences. Though the police obviously cannot prevent every 
terrorist attack, they can improve their effectiveness by adopting the intelligence-led 
policing model that has created crime reduction successes.63 The tools to do so are the 
same as the tools to reduce crime in the community: an informed, engaged community; 
trained, skilled, observant police officers; good intelligence and a willingness to follow it; 
information sharing; and effective tactics. 
Activities necessary to develop and execute a terrorist plot within the United 
States mirror activities necessary for planning and executing a criminal plot. Potential 
terrorists operate within communities as they plan and await execution of their plots. This 
means that terrorists interact with citizens and their activities are somewhat open to 
observation by residents and police. Otherwise ordinary criminal acts may actually be the 
activity of potential terrorists as they raise funds for or plan terrorist acts.64 Terrorists 
have been known to participate in low level criminal activity for fundraising, material 
acquisition, etc. Examples from the past include cigarette smuggling, burglary, and 
document forgery. This puts local police officers in the best position to encounter, 
discover, and interdict terrorist operations before their plans are carried out. The practice  
 
  
                                                 
62 George Kelling and William Sousa, Jr, Do Police Matter: An Analysis of the Impact of New York 
City’s Police Reforms (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, December 2001), 18. 
63 Paul Howard and Mark Riebling, eds, “Hard Won Lessons: Problem-Solving Principles for Local 
Police,” Safe Cities Project (New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, May 2005), 2. 
64 Melvin Carraway, quoted in Stephan Loyka, Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The 
Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series: Vol. 4: The Production and Sharing of Intelligence 
(Washington DC: Police Executive Research Forum, February 2005), 8.  
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of community policing that builds strong ties between the police and community 
members is an excellent vehicle to share information about potentially suspicious 
individuals.65 
As with other crime prevention programs, citizens should be educated about signs 
and indicators of suspicious activity and provided a mechanism to report tips. An 
example of a successful initiative was a video titled Seven Signs of Terrorism, and 
produced by the Michigan State Police to educate citizens about terrorism indicators.66 
Through training and experience, police officers develop well-honed abilities to detect 
suspicious behavior and disrupt criminal activity. 67 With added training for officers on 
indicators of terrorist activity, they can become increasingly effective at identifying local 
terrorist activity.68 As citizens are better educated about suspicious activity, they will be 
better able to notice it. Because of improved trust and communication with the police 
through community policing, citizens are more inclined to report their suspicions. 
Once citizens and police become more efficient at discovering and reporting 
suspicious activity, there must be a mechanism to receive these tips and determine their 
validity. It is critical to develop the analytical capacity to determine whether a tip or 
series of tips might indicate terrorist activity. This requires resources structured and 
committed to intelligence analysis and specialized training to develop expertise in 
terrorist capabilities, tactics, motivations, targets, and trends. Analysts need to understand 
precursor crimes and characteristic behaviors of terrorist plotters. The need to develop 
this capability is widely acknowledged.69  
                                                 
65 Robert Chapman and Matthew Schneider, “Community Policing and Terrorism,” Homeland 
Security (April 2003): 3. 
66 Michigan State Police, Seven Signs of Terrorism, http://www.michigan.gov/msp/0,1607,7-123-
1586_1710-155763--,00.html (accessed December 17, 2006). 
67 Cleary, “Strategy for Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection, Analysis, and 
Dissemination of Terrorist Information,” 22. 
68 Howard and Riebling, “Hard Won Lessons: Problem-Solving Principles for Local Police,” 22. 
69 Loyka, Protecting Your Community from Terrorism, 31. 
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Finally, effective law enforcement tactics need to be employed when intelligence 
identifies a credible threat. Traditional law enforcement tactics are transferable to many 
counterterrorism scenarios, but new threats require the development of new tactics.70  
F. FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL ILP IMPLEMENTATION – THE 3i 
MODEL 
For an agency to follow the NCISP and adopt this philosophy within their local 
context, a police leader must be able to identify the basic principles necessary to 
implement intelligence-led policing.71 A set of criteria have been gleaned from an article 
prepared for the Australian Institute of Criminology that introduced a 3i model (interpret, 
influence, and impact) of six necessary components of effective ILP implementation.  
This ILP model has three structures and three processes that are required for effective 
intelligence-led policing. Ratcliffe explains that after studying examples of successfully 
implemented ILP efforts, these six factors are necessary components of a true 
intelligence-led policing operation.  As outlined in Figure 3, this model forms the basis 
for the comparative analysis that follows in the next chapter. 
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Figure 3.   The 3i Model for Effective Intelligence-Led Policing 
 
 
1. Criminal Environment Structure 
While it seems obvious, Ratcliffe argues that there must be a criminal element 
that threatens public safety for law enforcement to study and analyze. Crime problems in 
America are now compounded by the threat of terrorism, providing activities and 
behaviors for analysts to study and understand.  
2. Intelligence Structure  
As a process or function within an agency, the agency must incorporate the 
intelligence cycle—the continuous cycle of tasking, collection, processing, analysis, 
dissemination, and feedback—which leads to generation of an intelligence product. 
Managed by upper management, this must generate intelligence with local relevance and 
be clearly and instantly significant to decision-makers. Ratcliffe writes that “within the 










to work effectively in both the interpretation of the criminal environment and the 
dissemination of a product that can shape the thinking of decision- makers.”72   
This is a critical component because structure matters a great deal in 
organizations. In other words, “performance is not manna that fall from heaven; 
organizations have to be structured, mobilized, and funded to carry out the activities that 
generate results.”73   For example, if the information collection function of an agency is 
organizationally separated from the analysis function preventing information from getting 
to the analysts, then obviously little quality intelligence would be developed. The fact 
that processes and structure matter is an often forgotten aspect of organizational 
performance. 
3. Decision-Maker Structure  
Systems have to be in place to share actionable, relevant intelligence with the 
decision-maker(s) in the agency. Agency decision makers must give priority to the 
intelligence and be able to properly understand and respond to the information. Decision-
makers must not be detached by cultural or organizational barriers that prevent them from 
receiving and acting on intelligence. This prevents intelligence from impacting threats 
and problems. The decision-maker structure is a bridge between the model’s interpret and 
the influence processes, and enables the intelligence to impact the threat.  
4. Interpret Process 
Scientific data analysis by skilled experts with the proper tools and collective 
understanding is critical to allow the agency to interpret a criminal or terrorist 
environment. This reflects a commitment of resources to build this analytical capacity 
within the agency. These necessary resources include people, tools, skills, techniques, 
and an understanding of the problems and targets.74  A more detailed discussion of the 
necessary personnel, training, skills, and tools to achieve quality analysis is included in 
Chapter IV. 
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5. Influence Process  
A core concept of ILP is that intelligence influences operational decisions. The 
decision-makers who would direct those operational decisions must first be influenced by 
the intelligence they receive. This highlights a very basic truth, that information can only 
affect behavior if it is used. There is no use in generating volumes of quality intelligence 
if it will be ignored by commanders or if they are not required to use it. It is also 
important that intelligence be produced for, disseminated to, and used by different levels 
of the agency hierarchy. A lieutenant or supervisor of a shift of officers needs intelligence 
that is tactical in nature and focused on his sphere of interest. District commanders, on 
the other hand, would find more value in intelligence that assesses district-wide problems 
and is more strategic in nature. When the chief executive identifies ILP as an agency 
priority, the chief signals to decision-makers to pay attention to and use the intelligence 
that they receive.  
6. Impact Process  
There is little value in implementing ILP if the decision-maker cannot reduce 
crime, prevent terrorism, and increase community safety. The implementation of proven 
strategies and tactics in response to accurate, actionable intelligence should result in these 
positive outcomes. The strategies and tactics that agencies develop and implement are 
often specific to their jurisdiction and to the problem at hand. The experiences of using 
the crime triangle framework, community policing, and Compstat have developed a skill 
set in law enforcement of developing and applying effective tactics to address specific 
problems. 
The presence of these six factors in an agency’s ILP efforts should then facilitate 
a successful and effective program. Success, of course, depends on many variables that 
are difficult to control. It is argued that the application of the tenets of this model should 
enable an agency to generate positive results.  
G. ILP IMPLEMENTATION IN THREE COUNTRIES  
Given the variety of implementation of ILP in the United States, it is useful to 
briefly discuss its use in other countries. This can provide a preliminary view of various 
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models of implementation. Three countries were selected and analyzed for similarities in 
their cultures and societies. The United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are all Western 
democracies with relatively open societies. They all have organized criminal elements 
and a clearly identified terrorist threat.  
1. United Kingdom75  
Intelligence-led policing was first identified and practiced as a distinct policing 
strategy in England in the early 1990s in response to rising crime and criticisms of police 
effectiveness.  Police were believed to spend too much time responding to calls and too 
little time identifying and targeting offenders.76   
There is strong support for the ILP model as an important aspect of policing in the 
United Kingdom, evidenced by the following statement in a government review of 
national crime strategies:  
Intelligence led decision making lies at the heart of effective delivery. We 
want every CDRP/CSP to undertake an intelligence led, problem-solving 
and outcome orientated approach to community safety. We believe the 
police National Intelligence Model provides a good practice framework 
for routinely analysing data and intelligence to inform strategic direction, 
accurately direct resources and manage risk.77  
As part of larger crime reduction strategies, police in the United Kingdom require 
intelligence analysis in the development of operational plans. Decision-makers who 
utilize intelligence and have become skilled at applying innovative, targeted tactics to 
problems identified through this process have achieved real crime reductions and 
successful terrorist disruptions.78  Numerous successes using the ILP concept as the basis 
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of crime reduction strategies are noted, including combating robbery, burglary, 
international fraud, narcotics, and hooliganism. Law enforcement in the United Kingdom 
has significant experience in counterterrorism operations based on their decades-long 
struggle with domestic terrorism. Though not directly linked to intelligence-led policing 
in articles, recent terrorism investigations in the United Kingdom demonstrate the power 
of the concept as collected information was analyzed and used to direct counter terrorism 
operations. Successful disruptions have resulted. 
The July 2006 arrests related to a terrorist plot to explode bombs on in-flight 
airliners indicates an advanced capacity in information gathering, analysis, and acting on 
actionable intelligence. These arrests demonstrate the difficulty of developing skilled 
analytical capability and a deep understanding of the threats within a community. 
Intelligence is hard, complex, inexact work that attempts to paint an accurate picture of 
assymetric, shadowy, international figures. These difficulties make exact predictions 
problematic.  
2. Australia 
Intelligence-led policing has been widely accepted within Australian law 
enforcement, though its application varies somewhat across agencies.79  Australian 
Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty highlighted the importance of ILP to 
Australian law enforcement during a 2004 address when he stated, “Importantly, we have 
moved to intelligence-led policing, to build our understanding of the environment and 
make most efficient use of our resources.”80   
The Australians have used analysis to identify and target hotspots and recidivist 
offenders.81  For example, an ILP application called Operation Anchorage targeted 
burglaries and led to a 21 percent reduction in burglaries in the Australian Capital 
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Territory.82  In this operation, a high ratio of intelligence analysts were assigned to the 
problem to achieve a much more objective targeting of offenders and locations. In 
counter-terrorism operations, state and territory police serve as the first line of reporting 
for suspicious activity, and have their own intelligence structure to analyze these 
activities. This highlights the importance of integrating intelligence sharing among the 
various levels of law enforcement. 
The Victoria Police Service identified ILP as one of its main priorities in its five-
year strategic plan.83  Aspects of their program include employing additional analysts to 
identify and target serious and repeat offenders through “crime data analysis, forensic 
sampling, and information sharing with other criminal justice agencies.” Their objective 
is to “enhance [their] research and evaluation capacity to address crime, community 
safety, and organizational performance.”  
ILP is a concept that appears to allow wide variety in implementation based on 
the needs of the jurisdiction, and this is evidenced by the Australian examples. Aspects of 
Ratcliffe’s model were noted among the writings, including the need to hire more and 
increasingly specialized analysts, and the need for management to incorporate the 
concept as an agency priority to institutionalize its use.  
3. Canada 
ILP within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is well developed.84  
That RCMP decision-makers support the concept was emphasized in an August 2005 
speech by RCMP Commissioner Giuliano Zaccardelli. He discussed the growing 
importance of intelligence-led policing in Canadian law enforcement.85  The 
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commissioner emphasized its importance in efforts against both criminal and terrorist 
activities. He articulated the importance of analysis integrated across disciplines to ensure 
proper local context. The intelligence program has been integrated into the decision-
making structure of the RCMP, and both decision-makers and line-level officers turn to 
intelligence for insight and guidance. Solutions to crime problems have become more 
innovative, and overall results are “impressive.”86  
Another example of the implementation of ILP in Canada was found within the 
Edmonton Police Service. EPS undertook a multi-year development and agency-wide 
implementation of ILP, called IMPACT (Intelligence Management, Performance and 
Accountability, Coordination of Tactics).87 Districts hold tactical management meetings 
to discuss intelligence and strategies, and to align operational activities with intelligence. 
By 2004, the EPS had added at least eleven analysts to the service to improve analysis. 
Strategic management steers the intelligence process to ensure that priorities and energies 
are properly directed. 
Successes are noted across Canada in burglaries, robberies, narcotics, and traffic 
safety. While there is no direct link attaching intelligence-led policing activities to the 
June 2006 arrests of seventeen Canadians who were planning terrorist attacks, the 
disruption of the plot prior to attack is potentially a successful application of improved 
intelligence capacity within Canada. Based on the comments of the RCMP’s top officer, 
there is strong support for ILP among Canadian law enforcement. He admits that they 
continue to face challenges, including developing analytic capacity and changing law 
enforcement culture from reactive to proactive. These examples tend to demonstrate a 
movement in Canada toward successful ILP implementation and to validate the criteria in 
Ratcliffe’s model. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Law enforcement agencies have a variety of means at their disposal to develop a 
picture of the situation in the community. Law enforcement intelligence is a structured 
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process that agencies can follow to develop an understanding of the threats in a 
community, criminal and otherwise. As a product, intelligence can be used to guide 
executive and operational decision-making to target known threats. There has been a 
push nationally to improve the intelligence capabilities of agencies to more effectively 
address crime and terrorist threats. The NCISP also places a priority on police agencies 
adopting the intelligence-led policing philosophy. Intelligence-led policing is offered as 
an operational strategy that should improve the ability of police to identify threats and 
coordinate resources against them, ultimately making for safer communities. After 
studying successful implementations of ILP, Jerry Ratcliffe developed a model of 
elements necessary for a successful program. The 3i model is used as a basis for 
comparison of ILP applications in this paper. Finally, this chapter concludes with a 
review of ILP applications in three foreign countries to provide the reader with a basic 









III. INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING IN TWO U.S. CITIES 
A. POLICE MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the reasons police managers choose 
different policing models and associated internal resource allocations. Police agencies 
across America adopt various models and choose widely different internal structures to 
implement their strategies. Two cities were selected for analysis in this study because 
they have adopted aspects of intelligence-led policing in their strategies. The Chicago 
Police Department in Chicago, Illinois, and the Metropolitan Nashville Police 
Department in Nashville, Tennessee, have implemented different policing models in the 
past decade, each with aspects of ILP. A discussion of the policing and ILP efforts of 
both departments follows in this chapter, and this is followed by a comparison of 
similarities and differences in the two examples.  
Over the last century and a half, policing has evolved through at least four models 
to make itself compatible with a democratic society.88 These models have resulted in the 
police assuming differing roles in society, and being more or less effective at reducing 
crime in communities. The political policing model (1840s to the 1930s) was marked by 
considerable political influence over all aspects of police work. Police had a close 
relationship with citizens, but delivery of services was heavily influenced by politics and 
corruption, and was generally ineffective. During the period influenced by the reform 
model (1930s to the 1960s) police adopted strict organizational principles and 
emphasized strict law enforcement. Turning to more modern management styles in the 
1960s, the service model of policing dominated (1960s to the 1980s).  Police assumed a 
broader role than the strict law enforcement mission of the reform era, and emphasized 
community relations, diversity in employment, and crime prevention. Much has been 
written about the community policing model and its transformation of the policing 
mission. As discussed in Chapter II, beginning in the 1980s and continuing today, this 
policing model is based on a belief that police and the community should collaborate to 
identify and solve community problems.  
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Regardless of the policing model adopted by agencies, police managers and 
elected officials must make decisions about staffing levels and internal allocation of 
police resources.89 Whether they use the intuitive, workload, or comparative approach, 
managers attempt to achieve the right level of police staffing for the demand and service 
load in their community.90 Within the agency, then, resources are allocated to various 
duties and functions (e.g., patrol, investigations, administrative, community policing, 
etc.) that are believed to be the most effective at accomplishing the goals of the 
organization. The manager’s view of how to best allocate resources (process, purpose, 
time, area) is reflected in the design or structure of the organization (its positions, 
functions, and specializations). 
The challenge for police managers is to select the proper police model and align 
police structure and processes within the resources of the community to deliver efficient, 
effective police services. There are likely as many examples of policing model and 
organizational configuration as there are police departments in the United States. Two 
agencies were chosen for this study based on their implementation of a policing model 
that incorporates elements of intelligence-led policing and caused organizational changes 
to achieve their objectives.  
The Chicago, Illinois, Police Department transformed it policing philosophy in 
the early 1990s, implementing a sweeping and comprehensive shift to community 
policing. This organization was selected for this study because in spite of this 
transformation, crime and the public perception that crime was continuing to increase 
caused another shift in policy to address crime problems. This most recent change 
introduced significant aspects of intelligence-led policing. 
The Metropolitan Nashville Police Department has a similar story. Practicing a 
traditional policing model through the early 1990s, elements of community policing were 
introduced to improve relationships with and responsiveness to the community. Crime 
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remained a problem, however, and when a new chief was hired several years ago, he 
brought in a new policing model that built on community policing, but also focused on 
effectiveness and efficiency. The practices and tools he implemented in Nashville are 
another flavor of ILP. 
B. CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
The city of Chicago, Illinois, has a great tradition and rich history in America. 
The largest city in the Midwest, it has transformed its image from a rough and tumble 
industrial city to a global, cosmopolitan center of culture and commerce.91 As a top 
destination for businesses and tourists, Chicago attracts over 30 million foreign and 
domestic visitors per year who spend nearly 10 billion dollars in the local economy.92  
The skyscraper is an iconic image of the city’s heritage of commerce, and the 
city’s economy continues to grow. At $390 billion, Chicago claims the third largest gross 
metropolitan product in the United States.93 Despite the perception that Chicago is an 
aging Rust Belt city, some experts report that it has the largest high technology and 
information-technology employment in the United States.94  
The city has always had a diverse population, and the racial makeup of Chicago 
continues to reflect that diversity and shows that new waves of immigration continue to 
shape the city. A 2006 estimate puts the city’s population at 2,873,790 people,95 and 
census data show city residents are 36 percent Black, 42 percent White, 26 percent 
Hispanic or Latino, and 4.3 percent Asian. Demonstrating the international diversity of 
the city, 21.7 percent of the city’s population was foreign-born in 2000 and 35.5 percent 
of residents lived in households where a foreign language was spoken.  
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In the minds of many, this view of a successful Chicago competes with a more 
infamous picture. For decades, Chicago leaders have struggled to overcome historical 
images of the city as crime-ridden and controlled by organized crime. The most infamous 
period in Chicago crime history was during the 1920s when organized crime figures like 
Al Capone and his Outfit controlled many aspects of city life. Organized crime in 
Chicago has contributed to colorful figures and incidents like Sam Giancana, Frank Nitti, 
and the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre.  
Since the 1940s, organized street gangs have contributed to violent street crime. 
Growing involvement with and struggles over control of the illicit drug trade have 
contributed to the growth of these gangs and associated violence. Dating to the 1950s, the 
Vice Lords are the oldest and second largest gang in the Chicagoland area, and they have 
a history of violence.96 The Black Gangster Disciples trace their origins to the 1960s, and 
today remain heavily involved with drugs, murders, and white collar crime.97 Hundreds 
of subgroups and minor gangs contribute to the problems of street violence. More than 
half of the homicides committed in Chicago each year are attributed to gangs that control 
drug markets.98 
For years Chicago has averaged around 600 homicides per year, and attempts by 
the city to impact levels of crime in the community lead to the implementation of 
Community Policing in the early 1990s.99 Under the direction of Mayor Richard Daley, 
CPD Superintendent Matt Rodriguez oversaw the establishment of community policing 
in 1992 and its implementation in 1993.100 Called the Chicago Alternative Policing 
Strategy program, or CAPS, it is an ongoing effort to bring communities, police, and 
                                                 
96 Know Gangs, Vice Lords. http://www.knowgangs.com/gang_resources/vice/ (accessed January 12, 
2007). 
97 Know Gangs, Black Gangster Disciples, http://www.knowgangs.com/gang_resources/ 
black_gangster _disciples/bgd_001.htm (accessed January 12, 2007). 
98 Dennis P. Rosenbaum and Cody Stephens, Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago: 
Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department (Chicago: Center for Research and Law in 
Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago, June 15, 2005), 6.  
99 Ibid., 6. 
100 Background information collected on history and development of Chicago Police Department from 
opens sources such as the CPD Web site at 
http://egov.cityofchicago.org/city/webportal/portalEntityHomeAction.do?entityName=Police&entityName
EnumValue=33, and wikipedia articles at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicago_Police_Department (Both 
last accessed January 12, 2007). 
39 
other city agencies together to prevent crimes rather than react after crimes occur. CAPS 
successfully integrated the community policing philosophy into the culture of the 
Chicago Police Department and improved relationships with Chicago citizens.101  
Despite these improvements in police-community relations, crime remained a 
pernicious problem, and continued to capture media attention. This frustrated the mayor 
and civic leaders who wanted to transform the city into an attractive metropolis of the 
world, requiring them, instead, to refocus their attention on problems of crime and 
violence.102  
In 2003, Mayor Daley appointed Phillip Cline as superintendent of police to lead 
the department’s crime reduction efforts. Changing the culture or redirecting the focus of 
any agency is a difficult test of leadership, and to do so in the CPD is a monumental task. 
With over 13,000 sworn officers and 2,600 other employees, CPD has a long and proud 
tradition. Building on a successful community policing model, Superintendent Cline sent 
a clear message to all employees that the focus of the entire organization was public 
violence, with the primary goal the reduction of homicides. Everyone, from officers on 
the street to commanders, knows that there are three priorities: gangs, homicides, and 
public violence.103  
Superintendent Cline’s strategy was to implement Compstat-like intelligence 
development and accountability, but to do so Chicago-style. His plan was that CPD 
would get smarter about knowing the criminals, organizations, and locations in the city 
that fostered violence and homicide, and commanders would be held accountable to 
applying effective tactics to prevent and reduce crime. The superintendent’s management 
strategy to accomplish these objectives included incorporating a new management 
philosophy and required some reorganization and restructuring. 
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1. The Deployment Operations Center 
Superintendent Cline made necessary personnel changes to make sure he had the 
right management team to implement this philosophy, and he created some special units 
and beefed up others. The change most central to implementing the superintendent’s 
strategy was the creation of the Deployment Operations Center, or DOC, and he created it 
to identify areas where resources would have the greatest impact.104 CPD policy defines 
the function and duties of the DOC: 
The DOC acts as the intelligence hub for the Department. The unit 
conducts tactical and analytical activities supporting effective deployment 
of field units. These analytical support activities are primarily focused on 
fostering reductions in violent crime, criminal gang activity, and organized 
crime activity as well as fostering counter terrorism efforts.105   
The DOC became the central point for collection, analysis, and distribution of 
crime information in the CPD. While each district retained some staff to work on district-
level crime stats, this centralization of resources reinforced the superintendent’s 
philosophy that the entire organization was involved with the crime-fighting mission. 
Resources committed to the DOC are significant: a commander, lieutenant, eight 
sergeants, and forty police officers. The organization and duties of the DOC are spelled 
out in policy:106 
1. Criminal Enterprise Group – Group is responsible for understanding and 
investigating traditional organized crime, to include terrorism. The unit 
also serves as the department’s liaison to Interpol. 
2. Counter Terrorism Section – Officers are responsible for obtaining 
intelligence on any homeland security issue, and conducting follow-up 
investigations. Section prepares threat assessments on special events and 
critical infrastructure. CT Section serves as liaison to federal agencies 
involved in counter terrorism investigations. 
3. JTTF—The Joint Terrorism Task Force is a joint partnership of the FBI 
and other law enforcement agencies and is responsible for follow-up 
investigations on international terrorism concerns. 
4. Deployment Analysis Group—“This group gathers information to assist in 
the effective recommendation for the deployment of Department resources 
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and the timely implementation of proactive policing.” Officers in this 
group work with field units to target places and people that are identified 
as problematic. “The Deployment Analysis Group gathers this information 
and analyzes it in conjunction with other factors such as incident analysis, 
calls for service, and input from correctional sources, and other agencies 
to provide accurate intelligence.”107 The Deployment Analysis Group 
collects information from the widest possible range of sources to identify 
geographic areas in each Police Area that will have the highest propensity 
for violence in the upcoming week. This information is disseminated 
through DOC reports and weekly DOC meetings. 
5. Gang Analytical Program/Technology Development Group—Group 
serves as the repository for gang information for the department. They 
maintain and update intelligence on gangs, hierarchies, organizations, etc.  
6. Morning Briefing/Administrative—Group is responsible for collecting all 
reports and intelligence related to violent crime that occurred within the 
past twenty-four hours. Information is evaluated for potential retaliatory 
threats and its relation to ongoing conflicts. A daily report is prepared for 
the executive staff. 
Thus the DOC became the embodiment of the intelligence cycle discussed earlier, 
and was created to develop and provide intelligence in support of agency-wide efforts. 
Chicago’s shift to ILP broke down traditional parochial intelligence structures and 
centralized intelligence in the DOC. Chicago has operationalized the intelligence cycle 
discussed in Chapter Two, with the DOC at the core. The superintendent has established 
the intelligence requirements and communicated them throughout the agency. These 
requirements establish the priorities that analysts in the DOC follow, and they drive 
operational activities. The next section discusses the various means of collecting 
information for analysts. 
2. Collection 
In an agency of 13,000 police officers assigned to hundreds of different 
assignments in dozens of facilities across the city, identifying and collecting relevant 
information about crime and criminals is a challenge. Creation of the DOC provided one 
central point to which information can flow for analysis. DOC supervisors call the unit 
“intelligence-driven,” and its mission is to collect information from all possible 
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sources.108 The effect has been that the CPD has increased the flow of information within 
the department and among criminal justice units.109 
Watch officers on duty in the DOC are responsible for collecting gang and violent 
crime information from throughout the city. Officers call them with information and 
watch officers stay in contact with officers in the field. A 24-hour department operations 
desk receives reports with all kinds of information from the field that are fed to the DOC. 
Relationships have been developed with state and local Department of Corrections staff 
to collect information on gang members, associates, and activities. DOC officers also go 
into the field and work with citizen sources and officers to glean additional information. 
A great amount of effort goes into collecting information on gang members and 
understanding gang activity.110  
As an example of the department’s aggressive collection efforts, narcotics, gang, 
and DOC officers respond to the area of violent crimes. While other detectives work on 
solving the immediate crime, these investigators work to leverage as much information as 
they can from their sources and contacts about the crime and the factors and actors 
associated with it. All of this information is fed to the DOC analysts.  
CPD has also used traditional enforcement activities as a tool to glean information 
about crime and criminals. For example, the CPD conducts seatbelt enforcement 
checkpoints in affected neighborhoods in the days following a violent crime. The 
checkpoint accomplishes a dual purpose. The traffic safety function is achieved, but 
perhaps more importantly, officers have a brief conversation with a number of citizens in 
a relatively non-confrontational setting. Officers can briefly inquire about the person’s 
knowledge of the recent crime or other criminal activity. The information they glean is 
forwarded to the DOC. 
Perhaps the major element of street-level intelligence-gathering activities in 
Chicago is the contact card. Beginning in 2003, CPD placed greater emphasis on officers 
completing contact cards on people they encounter during their tour of duty. 
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Demographic information is discretionarily collected from any person they encounter 
who they think could aid in investigations. Information includes names and identifiers as 
well as gang affiliations, associates, nicknames, etc. Cards are forwarded to the DOC 
where the information is used in the analysis, and has been extremely valuable. 
Commanders are held accountable for how many cards are completed by their officers, 
especially in violent crime areas. Officers completed 86,034 cards in 2003, and that 
number increased to 209,719 in 2004. Because of improvements in technology, the DOC 
is able to leverage all of this information.111 
3. Analysis 
All of the information collected is used to facilitate the DOC analysts’ ability to 
understand violent crime, gangs, and narcotics activity. The managers of the DOC have 
worked to develop the quality and sophistication of their analysis. In so doing, they work 
to change the focus of analysis from reactive to predictive. The DOC attempts to predict 
geographic areas, individual criminals, and groups that might be a source of violence. 
They make recommendations that identify high risk individuals or groups; they predict 
where violence is likely to erupt; and they recommend increases in police presence and 
targeted enforcement activity. DOC recommendations attempt to target violent offenders 
and try to anticipate and quell inter- and intra-gang and narcotics conflicts. First Deputy 
Dana Starks noted the distinction when she said that the “DOC just isn’t about putting 
officers in locations after something happened but it is preventative.”112 
The forty police officers and support staff assigned to the DOC are assigned one 
of the police districts to specialize on issues and problems in that area. In this way they 
develop a deeper understanding of crime and issues in that district, and they develop 
relationships with officers and citizens who provide them information. The analysts do 
communicate with one another to understand where crimes cross district boundaries, and 
to identify high risk individuals. Their main focus is to identify high risk people of 
interest and locations of concern.113  
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The elements of the DOC that concentrate on terrorism were outlined earlier. The 
analysts of the DOC provide an optimal mechanism to identify terrorists operating in the 
community. The JTTF and Counter Terrorism Units are responsible for follow-up 
investigations. As DOC analysts review collected information, they are well situated to 
monitor for patterns of activity and behavior indicative of terrorist activity. Rather than 
have a separate unit of analysts reviewing all information looking for terrorism, all DOC 
analysts are trained as terrorism generalists.114 
4. Dissemination 
The intelligence cycle calls for intelligence developed by analysts to be 
disseminated to decision-makers and operational resources so that it can affect decision 
making and resource allocation. The CPD has implemented a variety of ways to 
disseminate intelligence from the DOC. 
The most visible and intensive mechanism for dissemination is a weekly DOC 
meeting held by the superintendent. DOC meetings involve all exempt (executive) 
personnel. They are held Friday afternoons at 5:00 p.m. and can only be cancelled by the 
superintendent.115 At these meetings, information about crime trends, patterns, incidents, 
and issues is presented to commanders. Strategies for addressing the identified problems 
are discussed, and citywide operations for the coming week are planned. This 
accomplishes the Compstat-style meetings for information sharing and accountability. 
The DOC also disseminates information directly to officers and units by 
publishing bulletins, safety alerts, offender profiles, parolee releases, etc. All reports, 
maps, and other products produced by the DOC are available on the department’s 
intranet. The superintendent emphasizes communication and information sharing and has 
put IT systems into place to facilitate it.116 
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5. COMPSTAT Comparison 
The Chicago model of intelligence-led policing contains the six key elements 
described by Mastrofski, et al., as presented in Chapter II. These elements are listed here 
again with a brief discussion of Chicago’s activities in each element. 
1. Mission Clarification: The superintendent very clearly articulated CPD’s 
mission and said that it is the mission of every member of the agency. 
2. Internal Accountability: Through DOC meetings, VISE meetings, and 
data-driven review of effectiveness, accountability for commanders and 
officers is achieved.117 
3. Geographic Organization of Command: Twenty-five CPD commanders 
are responsible for the resources in their districts and for the results of 
their efforts. Area commanders are similarly held accountable, and have 
the ability to move resources across districts based on intelligence. 
4. Organizational Flexibility: The DOC meeting leads to strategies that cause 
commanders to deploy or redeploy resources among districts. Traditional 
barriers to sharing resources have been stricken by the superintendent, and 
there is a shared focus on violent crime. 
5. Data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of problem-solving 
efforts: The Chicago Police Department now has one of the most 
sophisticated information systems in law enforcement. This system 
facilitates hot spot identification and accountability measures. The sole 
purpose of the DOC is to develop the data-driven analysis that is then used 
by commanders to craft strategies. 
6. Innovative problem-solving tactics: CPD employs a variety of traditional, 
community-based, and creative measures to address crime concerns.  
It is clear from this review that Chicago does employ the basic principles of an 
effective Compstat process. As with its community policing initiatives from a decade 
earlier, Compstat was developed unique to the circumstances in Chicago.  
6. Impact 
Superintendent Cline summarized the impact of the changes they have 
implemented: “That means we’re deploying more officers into violence-prone areas. 
                                                 
117 Violence Initiative Strategy Evaluation, or VISE, meetings are facilitated by the Bureau of Crime 
Strategy and Accountability and are held at the district level to evaluate violence reduction strategies and 
progress.  The DOC meetings are agency-wide, while the VISE process serves to drive the ILP concept 
down into district operations. Accountability measures are conducted separate from the DOC. The DOC is 
focused on violent crime, and the Bureau of Crime Strategy and Accountability is responsible for analysis 
of effectiveness and accountability. This is intentional to prevent suspicion and distrust of the DOC. 
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We’re being proactive in these areas by increasing our contacts with these people, 
conducting more traffic missions, investigating more narcotics locations and going after 
gang members more strategically in order to prevent violent crime. As a result, violent 
crime in these areas is down.”118 There have been dramatic reductions in crime since 
Superintendent Cline introduced his philosophy. Homicides were cut by more than 400 
per year, and shootings were down 28 percent.119 Rosenbaum concludes that “with equal 
intensity, good street intelligence and real-time data from its warehouse, the CPD has 
responded rapidly to locations and individuals where gang retaliation is expected.”120  
C. NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 
Known as Music City USA for the country music industry’s concentration in the 
city, Nashville has been a center of commerce and culture in the South since before the 
Civil War. In modern times it has grown into a modern metropolis with a vibrant 
economy and diverse population. Nashville’s economy has a major presence of the health 
care, music, publishing, and transportation industries.121 The city’s population has grown 
to over 545,000 people, and more than 1.4 million people live in the region.122 The racial 
breakdown of the city is 65 percent White, 27 percent Black, and 4.7 percent Hispanic 
origin.  
Due to an attractive cost of living and growing job market, Nashville has become 
an attractive destination for immigrants to settle. In the decade preceding 2000, 
Nashville’s foreign-born population more than tripled in size to nearly 40,000 people. 
Large groups of Mexicans, Kurds, Vietnamese, Laotians, Arabs, Somalis, and others call 
Nashville home.123 Local government has been innovative in meeting the needs of a 
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growing community. In 1963, the municipal government of Nashville merged with the 
County government of Davidson County, forming what is referred to as the Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, popularly “Metro Nashville.” 
The police departments were also consolidated so that today the Metropolitan 
Nashville Police Department serves all of Nashville and Davidson County. The 
department has over 1,300 sworn officers and its jurisdiction covers 533 square miles.124 
Crime trends in Nashville have followed those of many other cities. The 2004 statistics 
showed that Nashville’s crime rates were higher than Tennessee’s and the national 
averages. The city’s crime problems include commercial and street robberies, aggravated 
assaults, and gangs.125 In recent years, Hispanic gangs have contributed to violence and 
homicides in the city.126  
Nashville’s concerns about terrorist activity occurring in the city are similar to 
those of other major cities in America. The September 2006 release of details from the 
National Intelligence Estimate reaffirms that this threat is growing. The “operational 
threat from self-radicalized cells will grow in importance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, 
particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.”127  
Nashville has experienced the type of activity associated with planning by a 
domestic terrorist. The May 31, 2006, arrest of a former Davidson County corrections 
officer for possession of pipe bombs, weapons, silencers, and the deadly poison ricin (that 
he apparently manufactured in his backyard shed) demonstrated the fact that no 
community is immune from the threat of terrorist-style weapons and planning.128 
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1. Accountability Driven Leadership 
Ronal W. Serpas was appointed chief of the MNPD on January 12, 2004, and he 
promptly initiated Accountability Driven Leadership (ADL).129 The chief has developed 
his management strategy based in large part on the elements of Compstat and he has 
incorporated a version of intelligence-led policing into Nashville policing. Chief Serpas 
began his law enforcement career and served more than twenty years with the New 
Orleans, Louisiana, Police Department. During his tenure with New Orleans, Chief 
Serpas worked on development of a Compstat-style policing strategy for New Orleans 
PD. After his retirement, Chief Serpas was appointed chief of the Washington State 
Patrol where he implemented his policing philosophy under the Accountability Driven 
Leadership moniker.130 
As implemented in Washington, ADL focuses on effectiveness and efficiency of 
police operations. Chief Serpas reorganized the force to achieve his management 
objectives, creating a Management Services Bureau. ADL’s main objectives are 
management definition of priorities, identification of desired outcomes, and performance 
measures to achieve those outcomes. It achieves the concepts of Compstat and includes 
non law enforcement functions in management accountability. In the Washington State 
Patrol, Serpas held commanders accountable for budgeting and administrative functions 
as well as law enforcement objectives.131  
Prior to his arrival in Nashville, Chief Serpas provided copies of his article on 
ADL to the Metro Nashville PD executive staff, informing them that this would be the 
new policing strategy. The chief mandates that the entire agency participates in ADL, and 
uses a Compstat setting to identify problems, make operational decisions, and review the 
success of strategies.132 He reorganized the investigations and analysis functions of the 
department to facilitate the new philosophy. More analysts were added and investigations 
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130 Ronal Serpas, “Beyond Compstat: Accountability-Driven Leadership,” Police Chief (71:1 January 
2004) 24-31. 
131 Ronal Serpas, Beyond Compstat: Accountability Driven Leadership in a Statewide Agency: The 
Washington State Patrol–Effectiveness Through Efficiencies, unpublished paper provided by Chief Ronal 
Serpas on January 5, 2006 (undated), 7-9. 
132 Kelton, Interview. 
49 
were decentralized, with detectives reassigned from headquarters to the districts. The new 
processes implemented by Chief Serpas operationalized aspects of the intelligence cycle 
discussed in Chapter Two. The chief established the requirements for the entire agency, 
and communicated them effectively to staff at all levels. A centralized analysis unit 
assigned to the chief’s office is responsible for collecting information from all available 
data sources and preparing Compstat materials. The next sections discuss how Nashville 
performs the next steps in the intelligence cycle. 
2. Collection 
The analysis unit is responsible for collecting information from all available data 
sources in the department. This ensures consistency of information across the 
geographically dispersed districts. Operations personnel collect information in the field 
and provide it to the unit for inclusion in the analysis.133 Improvements in information 
technology have given analysts access to more data systems and are enabling the analysis 
of near real-time data.134  
3 Analysis 
There are two tiers of analysis within Metro Nashville PD. The department-wide 
comprehensive analysis of crime and the effectiveness of crime reduction efforts are 
accomplished by the central analysis unit. This office puts together Compstat books for 
the weekly Compstat meeting. Increased data quality has allowed an increase in 
analytical sophistication. Temporal analysis showing crime data across time and location 
has enhanced their understanding of problems and improves the effectiveness of resource 
allocations. Emphasis on high risk individuals has focused on recidivists and gang 
members. An effort to identify repeat offenders has supported operations targeting these 
high risk individuals. Increased gang analysis has been tied to increased gang 
enforcement. Each district has also retained CAP officers who perform statistical 
analysis. This has enabled district commanders to take analytical products from the 
central analysis unit and focus district-level activities on identified problems. 
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Commanders believe that they have a better understanding of crime problems allowing 
them to develop better strategies to address them.135 
4. Dissemination 
The primary vehicle for disseminating intelligence is the once-weekly Compstat 
meeting. Chief Serpas believes that he himself must demonstrate the importance of the 
Compstat process by personally attending and participating in each meeting. Nashville’s 
meetings can only be cancelled by the chief, and only once has he cancelled a meeting.136  
A characteristic that distinguishes Nashville’s process is that every section of the 
department is required to participate and present on their activities of the week. In 
addition to operational field commands, this includes administrative (e.g., fleet, finance, 
property storage), and community-oriented (e.g.,. Crimewatch, PAL Club, etc). As part of 
the ADL philosophy, the intent of including these commands achieves several purposes. 
First, the prominence of crime reduction as the primary department objective can be 
reinforced to all areas of the agency. Second, every commander understands that they 
have some responsibility for that mission, and they are quizzed about their efforts that 
week. Finally, the meetings enhance intra-agency communication as well as problem 
identification, understanding, and strategies.  
Another layer of Compstat meetings involves a weekly district-level Compstat 
meeting. These meetings follow the Compstat format that presents a summary of crime 
and trends and issues, but only for an affected district. The district commander involves 
all supervisors in the district. This process requires the commander to reinforce crime 
reduction priorities, review crime data and strategies with supervisors, facilitate vertical 
communication, and hold lower level supervisors accountable for results. As management 
is achieving results through others, involving the supervisors down to the line level is an 
important aspect of this strategy.137 Commanders have accepted the ADL philosophy and 
incorporated it into their operations. Through the process, they have increased 
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information sharing, enhanced understanding of crime problems citywide, and improved 
accountability and ownership of problems and solutions.138 
5. COMPSTAT Comparison 
Chief Serpas developed Compstat in New Orleans Compstat and expended those 
principles to develop the Accountability Driven Leadership model. The Nashville model 
of intelligence-led policing does contain the six key Compstat elements. These elements 
are presented again with a brief discussion of Nashville’s activities in each element. 
1. Mission Clarification: The chief has very clearly articulated Nashville’s 
mission, and ensured that every commander and officer understands that it 
is the mission of every member of the agency. 
2. Internal Accountability: Through citywide and district Compstat meetings, 
accountability for commanders and officers is achieved. 
3. Geographic Organization of Command: District commanders are 
responsible the resources on their districts and for the results of their 
efforts.  
4. Organizational Flexibility: Citywide and district-level crime problems are 
discussed at Compstat meetings and commanders discuss strategies to 
address them. Resources are shared across traditional district boundaries 
based on this analysis. 
5. Data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of problem-solving 
efforts: MNPD continues to develop the technology and analytical skills to 
improve the sophistication of their analysis. Chief Serpas believes they are 
“on the cusp” of making predictive analysis.139 
6. Innovative problem-solving tactics: MNPD commanders are encouraged 
to develop creative, innovative strategies and tactics to address problems. 
Policy supports risk taking and encourages community participation.  
6. Impact 
“The Compstat philosophy has changed this police department,” is how one 
commander described the effect of increased intelligence and accountability.140 Violent 
crime is down overall across the city, though there was an increase in homicides at the  
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end of 2006. Crime in the North Precinct, one of the city’s more crime-ridden districts, is 
down 7.78 percent.141 Community support for the police has improved and citizen 
perception of safety has increased.142  
D. COMPARISON OF TWO APPLICATIONS 
Both departments have implemented their own versions of intelligence-led 
policing unique to the local needs and circumstances. Understanding that achieving new 
results requires new actions, the chiefs in both cities openly acknowledged that a shift in 
policing strategy was necessary to achieve different results than they had previously been 
able to achieve. There were many similarities in the approach that both agencies 
followed, and a few differences. A review of these will help to identify the strategic 
dimensions of an effective ILP program. 
1. Similarities  
Consistent with the intelligence cycle, the chief or superintendent in both cities 
has clearly articulated and clarified mission around specific priorities. In Chicago, 
Superintendent Cline directed the focus of the entire agency toward homicide, gangs, 
narcotics, and public violence. In Nashville, Chief Serpas established crime reduction as 
the priority of the entire agency.  
A central aspect of each leader’s strategy was to increase the importance of 
analysis, and each furthered that objective by creating or strengthening a centralized 
analytical unit. These units serve to develop intelligence and as the agency repository. In 
Chicago, the superintendent eliminated the department’s stand alone intelligence unit, 
and he created and fully resourced the Deployment Operations Center. Nashville’s central 
Crime Analysis Unit was established as the point in the agency for gathering and 
developing intelligence on crime issues and trends.  This physical reorganization and 
functional realignment caused the intelligence function to be redefined and 
institutionalized.  
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Because of this centralization and reorganization, increased sophistication of 
analysis is possible to allow for narrowly identifying specific high risk individuals, 
groups, and locations. The DOC in Chicago is providing extremely detailed analysis, 
identifying high risk locations and individuals before violence occurs. In Nashville, 
analysts have improved the sophistication of their work by providing temporal analysis 
and identification of recidivist offenders. 
One key to producing sophisticated analyses of threats has been to increase the 
amount and quality of information that is collected and made available to analysts. Both 
agencies worked to improve information systems so that as many internal data sources as 
possible are available, accurate, and in as close to real time as possible. This is often a 
very difficult task and requires much effort. Both agencies expanded their reach into 
external information sources as well, to ensure that analysts can develop an accurate 
estimate of threats. Finally, both agencies, but notably Chicago, have increased their 
efforts to proactively obtain information from the field. In Chicago, DOC officers, gang 
and narcotics specialists go into the field to interview officers, suspects, witnesses, and 
informants to glean information. Nashville has mechanisms in place to incorporate 
information from officers and citizens, and while its efforts are not as aggressive or 
extensive as Chicago’s, they demonstrate the emphasis placed on obtaining information 
and sharing intelligence. 
Technology enhancements helped improve collection, analysis, and 
dissemination. Chicago has leveraged a partnership with an information technology 
corporation over the years to develop and implement an information management system 
that provides real time access to records and information.143 Relational databases give 
analysts the ability to see patterns and trends in minutes, work that might have taken 
hours or days in the past. Chief Serpas described efforts to improve information 
technology to provide this type of power and flexibility with data. Improvements have 
allowed greater temporal analysis, and he said that they continue to improve information 
management systems.144 The experience in both cities highlights this issue as one of 
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great importance in implementing an effective ILP strategy. As agencies improve their 
collection of information and expand their information sources, the ability to effectively 
process and exploit that information and make it manageable for analysts is increasingly 
dependent on information technology.  
Another similarity of the Chicago and Nashville efforts has been one of focus. As 
collection efforts have expanded the amount of information available for analysis, and as 
analysis has increased in sophistication, the focus of analysis has shifted from micro 
street-level problems to district, agency, or citywide threats. In both cities, the 
superintendent or chief directed the shift in focus to address citywide problems across 
traditional boundaries. This appears to have resulted in increased cooperation between 
department units and improved the effectiveness of their efforts.  
In previous sections, the efforts in both cities were compared against the elements 
of Compstat programs. That comparison showed that both Chicago and Nashville require 
intelligence input into operational decisions. Both agencies effectively incorporated 
intelligence into the problem identification and strategy development processes. This 
began as a requirement from the chief executive, but it become a standard practice as the 
quality of analysis improved.  
To support effective crime strategies, intelligence must be timely. In both cities, 
great effort has been given to producing and disseminating intelligence reports as quickly 
as possible. Improved information technologies, information collection, and internal 
processes have likely led to these improvements.  
Weekly command meetings serve to disseminate intelligence, reinforce the chief 
executive’s priorities, communicate problems and strategies, and enhance accountability. 
In Chicago, these take the form of DOC meetings held every Friday afternoon at 5:00. In 
Nashville, Compstat meetings are held every Friday morning. In the meeting format that 
developed in both cities, command accountability is achieved without belittling or 
embarrassing commanders. 
The positive effects of the weekly command meetings are replicated at lower 
organizational levels in both cities. Weekly district-level crime strategy meetings serve to 
drive chief’s priorities down to street level; disseminate and communicate intelligence; 
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discuss and evaluate problems and strategies; and enhance accountability at the district 
level. This improves ownership of problems and strategies at the street level. 
Both departments have maintained and built this strategy on existing community 
policing practices. There is a belief that maintaining close relationships with the 
community enhances communication, improves the effectiveness of police in the 
community, and enhances intelligence-led efforts.145 
Finally, the primary focus of ILP efforts in both cities has been on crime 
identification and reduction, and terrorism has been a secondary priority. Chicago has 
counter-terrorism resources in the DOC and their analysts are terrorism generalists, which 
seems to satisfy commanders. Nashville maintains an intelligence unit in liaison with the 
JTTF and provides training for officers and other personnel on terrorism issues. 146  
2. Differences 
The main differences noted between the practices of the two agencies stem from 
the several year head start that Chicago had on Nashville. This, along with the millions of 
dollars that Chicago has spent on information technology systems, has given them a 
decided advantage. The elements of the intelligence cycle are clearly institutionalized in 
the Chicago Police Department with the DOC as an effective central hub. Nashville is 
implementing the same model and has seen early success. One noticeable difference is 
that Nashville maintains a separate intelligence unit apart from the central analytical unit. 
Based on the findings of this research, this separates parts of the functions of the 
intelligence cycle and provides potential gaps in information collection and sharing, 
especially given the nature of some internal units to hoard information. Incomplete or  
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inaccurate assessments on the crime and terrorist threat are possible if analysts do not 
have access to every available information source, and inadequate or misdirected 
strategies can be the result. 
Another difference noted is Nashville’s inclusion and review of the activities of 
every section of the department. While Chicago’s focus is on a several specific crime 
categories, Chief Serpas’ ADL model attempts to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of every part of the agency. Finding efficiencies and improving 
effectiveness can lead to having extra resources to dedicate to operational activities. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter began with a brief discussion of the reasons and ways police 
agencies organize themselves to deliver services to their specific jurisdictions. There is a 
relationship between organizational structure and the agency’s ability to implement a 
particular policing philosophy. For example, certain philosophies, such as Community 
Policing, require more resources focused on community interaction and less on rapid 
deployment. Understanding this will help police executives structure their agencies to 
deliver services efficiently and effectively.  
The relation between organizational structure and effective service delivery were 
highlighted when the ILP efforts of two large city police departments were analyzed. The 
Chicago, Illinois, PD and the Metro Nashville, Tennessee, PD both initiated a change in 
policing strategy, and this shift was preceded and facilitated by a change in organizational 
structure. Chicago PD implemented ILP throughout the organization, and the centralized 
Deployment Operations Center was a central element of their success. Metro Nashville’s 
ILP implementation continues to develop and a formalized Compstat model, called 
Accountability Driven Leadership, has established their philosophy. Both agencies have 
achieved improvements in efficiency and reductions in crime. The ability to develop 
through their own versions of ILP increasingly sophisticated estimates of the elements of 
the threats to community safety is at the core of the successes in both cities. 
Though implementation of ILP across different agencies can appear haphazard 
and specific to the local jurisdiction, this review shows that in these two cities, there are 
certain important factors of effective strategies. The next chapter will compare the 
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strategic dimensions of the 3i model against dimensions of the Chicago and Nashville 
policing strategies. This will provide insight into whether the dimensions identified in the 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter begins with a review of the 3i model introduced in Chapter II as a set 
of criteria to assess the effectiveness of intelligence-led policing programs. A comparison 
of the aspects of the programs in Chicago and Nashville against the criteria in the 3i 
model leads to recommendations for the implementation of intelligence-led policing. 
After identifying the strategic dimensions of an effective program, a framework for 
identifying implementation factors will be explained. Implementation of a new strategy 
or philosophy in any business inevitably encounters obstacles. A brief discussion is 
presented here on potential barriers to implementation and suggestions for overcoming 
them.  
A. CHICAGO AND NASHVILLE VIS A VIS THE 3i MODEL  
Table 1 presents the strategic dimensions of the 3i model and indicates whether 
the implementations of ILP in Chicago and Nashville contain that dimension. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to develop quantitative measurements of these strategic 
dimensions and statistically measure conformity. It is useful, however, to identify the 
degree to which each department utilizes the strategic dimension. This nominal measure, 
from high to low, as presented in Table 1, provides a general assessment of the 
implementation of that element by the agency based on this analysis. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Chicago PD and Metro Nashville PD against the 3i Model 
 




Environment Structure High High 
Intelligence Structure High High 
Interpret Process High Medium/High 
Decision Maker Structure High High 
Influence Process High High 
Impact Process High High 
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A quick review of crime statistics in both cities reveals that in spite of successes 
at crime reductions, crime remains an issue. The presence of criminal structure is a basis 
of the 3i model so that there are factors of crime to analyze. Criminal enterprise is a 
problem both prior to and after implementation of the model.  
The intelligence structure was reorganized and redefined in both the Nashville 
and Chicago Police Departments. The Deployment Operations Center in Chicago became 
the central point for the collection of information and generation of intelligence in 
support of agency-wide operations. This was made possible by the restructuring and 
consolidation of the intelligence resources and functions. Nashville similarly consolidated 
intelligence resources and functions, though not completely. The steps taken increased 
capacity for analysis and intelligence creation. 
This concentration of intelligence functions and resources improved the ability to 
produce targeted, quality, relevant and timely intelligence products. It is clear that both 
agencies developed the capacity to identify and understand criminal threats and problems 
in their jurisdictions. The DOC in Chicago developed processes and skills to produce 
advanced and sophisticated analyses. The quality of the analysis produced in Nashville 
continues to increase. Thus, both agencies developed sufficient interpret processes to 
support effective ILP. 
The 3i model articulates a need for a decision- maker structure to enable agency 
decision-makers to receive and act on intelligence about issues and threats. Various 
organizational barriers can exist that would prevent such intelligence from reaching the 
decision-maker and impacting decisions. Personal barriers such as apathy or differing 
priorities could block intelligence from them. The decision-maker structure in both 
Chicago and Nashville, however, facilitates intelligence reaching the decision makers. 
This has been achieved through policy (chief or superintendent order), structure 
(centralized intelligence structure), and technology. All of these elements are also 
captured in the command meeting. The DOC meeting in Chicago and the Compstat 
meeting in Nashville serve to deliver intelligence to departmental decision-makers in an 
effective, targeted manner. Decision-makers are accountable for results of their efforts 
addressing problems, ensuring that intelligence is received and acted upon.  
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Once mechanisms are in place for intelligence to reach decision-makers and they 
have given it priority, the 3i model requires that their decisions will be influenced by it. 
Identification of these influence processes in both departments was discussed and 
verified. The question is whether the intelligence influences operational decisions. Both 
Chicago and Nashville require intelligence to make operational decisions. These 
influence processes are facilitated by several factors. Creation of a centralized 
intelligence structure ensures a consistent, reliable intelligence product which facilitates 
decision-making. The weekly command meetings present intelligence to commanders 
where they discuss strategies that were developed based on intelligence. Commanders in 
both agencies rely on this intelligence information to make operational decisions as it has 
been shown to be effective and more efficiently targets their limited resources.   
The impact process is an evaluation of whether the ILP processes and structures 
impact crime or terrorism. In the case of both Chicago and Nashville, indications are that 
they have. Even without the ability to identify all the factors that might influence crime 
and criminality to statistically show correlation between ILP measures and reduced 
crime, there is encouraging anecdotal evidence that it has made a difference. The 
implementation of proven strategies and tactics in response to accurate, actionable 
intelligence should result in more effective and efficient policing.  
1. Strategy Map of Strategic Factors 
The strategy map provides a visual depiction of the strategic dimensions that 
allow for a successful business model, in this case intelligence-led policing.147 As shown 
in Figure 4, the strategic elements of the policing strategy of four police strategies are 
charted in the strategy map. Chicago PD policing strategy is charted both before and after 
the creation of the DOC and their implementation of ILP. The policing strategies of 
Metro Nashville PD before and after implementation of ADL are also charted. The 
strategy map lists several dimensions of policing strategy across the Y axis. Six of these 
factors are the elements of successful ILP program articulated in the 3i model (see Table 
1). Based on the analysis of their operations, three other dimensions are important 
                                                 
147 W. Chan Kim and Renée Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market 
Space and Make the Competition Irrelevant (New York: Harvard Business School Press, 2005), 25-28. 
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elements of the ILP programs in Chicago and Nashville and are presented here to 
illustrate their importance. These three additional dimensions are a proactive crime focus, 
a centralized intelligence function, and organized collection of information. As with the 
factors listed in Table 1, these nominal measurements represent generalizations about the 
degree the strategic element is present in the policing strategy of the agency, as 
determined by the preceding analysis. 
 Proactive Crime Focus: Previous sections showed how agencies implementing 
ILP look at proactively at crimes and criminals as opposed to being operating reactively. 
The analyses of Chicago and Nashville police departments demonstrate that both 
agencies made this strategic shift, Chicago more so than Nashville, but both have made 
great strides. As the strategy map illustrates, before their implementation of ILP, both 
agencies had a much more reactive focus.  
Centralized intelligence function: The 3i model demonstrates the importance of 
an effective intelligence structure. It is clear that both Chicago and Nashville centralized 
the intelligence function as a central tenet of their strategies. This appears to have been 
important to the success of their programs, and is therefore listed as a separate strategic 
dimension. The intelligence structure dimension therefore refers to the internal structure, 
assignment of sufficient personnel, skills, training, etc., that make up an effective 
intelligence unit. The centralized intelligence function dimension refers to the degree to 
which the intelligence structure was centralized to implement the strategy. It is clear that 
Chicago PD did so, and Nashville is making progress toward high effectiveness.  
Organized collection of information: Without collection of an adequate volume of 
the right kinds of information, there will be no intelligence generated. So while it may 
seem integral to building an adequate intelligence structure, collection is here broken out 
as a separate strategic dimension due to its importance to the entire cycle. As shown in 
the analysis of the programs in Chicago and Nashville, both agencies made improved 







































Figure 4.   Strategy Map—Intelligence-Led Policing in Two Cities 
 
The strategy map highlights the great changes in policy, process, and structure 
made by both agencies. Note that neither the pre-ADL Nashville PD nor the pre-DOC 
Chicago PD register influence process or impact process. This illustrates the 3i model’s 
argument that in order to be able to influence decision-makers, accurate and relevant 
intelligence must first be generated. Similarly, for decision-makers to impact crime 
through ILP, they must have intelligence of the type described herein. Prior to the 
implementation of ILP models in these two cities, the police certainly had the ability to 
impact crime and disorder in their communities through traditional or community-based 
means. The agencies did not have the structures or processes in place, however, to 
influence leaders or impact crime with good intelligence.  
The analysis of the intelligence-led policing efforts in Chicago and Nashville 
highlights the importance of the 3i model elements as well as the other strategic 
dimensions shown in the strategy map. These should be considered when an agency 
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considers implementing a strategic shift to incorporate ILP. As the analysis of Chicago 
and Nashville demonstrates, it is possible to be flexible in designing the model to account 
for local issues. The next section provides a framework for evaluating a police agency’s 
strategy and ensuring that the critical strategic dimensions of ILP are included in an 
agency’s strategy while allowing for local variation. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE THEORY OF ILP 
1. Four Actions Framework 
Once a police manager understands the strategic dimensions of an effective 
policing strategy as presented in the strategy map, the four actions framework helps the 
decision-maker evaluate current operations.148 Designed to assist the decision maker in 
understanding the factors necessary to change the current organization and achieve the 
efficiencies and increased effectiveness of the ILP strategy curve presented in Figure 4, 
the four actions framework asks four questions to challenge the current strategy: 
1. Which of the factors in the current policing strategy should be eliminated? 
2. Which factors (e.g. policies, staffing, practices, etc.) in the current policing 
strategy should be reduced well below levels of the current strategy? 
3. Which factors should be raised well above traditional levels? 
4. Which new factors should be created that the police agency has never 
done?  
With an understanding of the 3i model and the above analysis of effective 
intelligence-led policing efforts, the answers to these questions are answered in the next 
section as they would apply to an agency looking to transform to ILP. Figure 5 presents 
the four actions framework of critical factors for an agency looking to implement ILP. 
Each agency considering a strategic shift of its policing model to ILP would apply this 
framework to their organization and develop recommendations specific to their structure 
and personnel.  
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Figure 5.   Four Actions Framework 
 
a. Eliminate  
• Eliminate reactive strategic focus—The agency should shift its 
thinking about crime problems and work to prevent crime 
problems by understanding and anticipating the factors 
contributing to crime and violence.  
• Eliminate separation of intelligence and operations—Chiefs should 
understand the past tendencies of agencies to place the 
responsibility for anything termed intelligence to a small 
specialized unit that is insulated from the larger organization. This 
practice must be eliminated for ILP to be successful and to realize 
efficiencies and increased effectiveness. The reforms in Chicago 
give a clear example of this. 
b. Reduce 
• Reduce technological and organizational barriers to the sharing of 
intelligence—Organizational barriers should be removed and 
policies and processes implemented that facilitate communication 
and information sharing need developed. Improved technology,  
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reorganization, and new policy have increased the ability of both 
Chicago and Nashville to develop and share intelligence within the 
agency.  
• Reduce small unit monopoly on the creation and holding of 
intelligence—Agencies should ensure that units within the agency 
are not allowed to squirrel away the intelligence they develop as 
part of their duties. This is a common occurrence, especially in 
larger organizations. Through performance of their duties, police 
develop information about criminals and crime threats. This 
sometimes results in a situation when specialized units develop a 
fairly complex understanding of a particular crime, but fail to share 
what they know with other units, even if the information is specific 
to the other units’ crime specialty. This problem highlights the 
importance of a centralized, sophisticated intelligence structure and 
policies that support sharing. 
c. Raise 
• Raise analytical capacity—To have an adequate intelligence 
structure to support operational decision-making, it is necessary to 
develop analytical capacity to produce sophisticated and accurate 
intelligence. This can be achieved by ensuring that there are an 
adequate number of analysts and by improving the analytical 
acumen through training and experience. 
• Raise delivery to and incorporation of intelligence into decision-
maker actions—The 3i model highlights the importance of the 
decision-maker structure. Decision-makers need policies and 
processes to ensure that they receive and use this improved 
intelligence to guide their decisions.  
• Raise intelligence-driven tactics—Police commanders should 
develop and apply tactics and strategies which are specifically 
crafted to target threats, problems, and trends identified through 
the ILP analytical process.  
d. Create 
• Create capacity for robust collection—The agency needs to place 
an emphasis on collecting information from a wide variety of 
internal and external sources.  
• Create targeted, timely dissemination—In order to be most 
valuable to operational decisions, bulletins and other 
disseminations of intelligence information must be timely, 
accurate, and targeted to specific audiences (e.g., commanders, 
unit-level, agency-wide).  
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• Create intelligence-based accountability—Intelligence-driven 
operations must become the heart of the department’s strategy, and 
to ensure that its members are focusing their efforts where they 
will have the greatest impact, the intelligence must become the 
source of accountability. Both Nashville and Chicago have 
transformed their operations by doing so, and have done so without 
creating an atmosphere of fear and mistrust. 
• Create agency-wide mission alignment—Perhaps the most 
important lesson from the case studies of ILP in two cities is that 
the chief executive must establish specific agency priorities, and 
articulate the centrality of ILP to the mission of the agency. It is 
evident in the success of both Chicago and Nashville’s efforts that 
the support and involvement of the leader is critical. 
This application of the four actions framework is illustrative of the insights that 
can be gained in an analysis of an agency’s operations. To implement the change to an 
intelligence-led policing model, this type of careful review of an agency must precede 
changes to ensure that organizational structure, policies, and processes align with the new 
mission. The next section identifies several factors that can present significant barriers 
when implementing change.  
2. Implementation Barriers 
Managers attempting to bring about change in an organization often face four 
hurdles to successful implementation.149 Though every change is different, and a 
manager may not face all four, it is important to anticipate and understand these potential 
hurdles to manage the organizational risk inherent in change. Addressing this risk early 
improves the chances that when it comes time to implement the new strategy, adequate 
measures have been taken to prevent these hurdles from undermining the leader’s efforts. 
Cognitive Hurdle—The first hurdle is cognitive. Managers must instill the need 
for the strategic change in employees. Police officers, supervisors, and managers may be 
comfortable in traditional patterns, and if they have performed well in the current 
                                                 
149 The discussion of hurdles to implementation is adapted from Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean 
Strategy, 147-169. It is presented here to illustrate the internal challenges a manager faces when attempting 
to implement change in an organization. The potential for internal opposition to change is steep, and this 
section is not intended to present an exhaustive list of all possible problems a manager might encounter. 
There are many strategies that can be developed to anticipate and overcome this opposition; however the 
outline developed in Blue Ocean is presented as an example that is concise, thorough, and practical for 
managers to follow.  
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organization, they may not agree with the need to change. For a change to be successful, 
employees and managers need to believe in the need for change.  
Police managers may attempt to make their case by citing crime statistics, but 
officers are often not swayed by this argument because numbers are abstract 
representations and can be manipulated. To get police supervisors and managers to 
understand the need for change, it is often necessary to have them experience the 
problems first hand. It may have been years since many commanders have spent much 
time in the field dealing with the problems faced by officers. Similarly, over time, it is 
easy to lose touch with the problems that residents sometimes face when trying to receive 
service from the agency. One way to truly understand the issues and problems that an 
agency faces in efficiently delivering its services is to put commanders and executives 
into the field doing the job of line-level officers. Requiring them to spend time handling 
the problems and experiencing the frustrations can force them to understand the need for 
change. Also, putting commanders in the position of interacting with residents can 
provide eye-opening feedback. Chicago Superintendent Cline has all exempt (command) 
personnel work in the field every Friday night after the weekly DOC meetings so that 
they experience and understand the crime problems that they talk about in the abstract 
during the meetings.  
This is one method to break the cognitive hurdle and have employees understand 
the need for strategic change. Police executives must understand the importance of this 
aspect and give it attention. 
Resource Hurdle—Often a change in strategy to address crime or other problems 
is associated with a call for additional resources. Calls by chiefs and police unions for 
additional officers to answer rising crime are common. This may present itself as a hurdle 
internally and externally. Police commanders, police unions, and elected officials may 
resist a change to an ILP strategy based on the belief that there are insufficient resources 




These concerns must be answered in order to gain the support of key players for 
the change. One answer to these concerns is that intelligence-led policing should by its 
nature allow police to more effectively apply its resources toward problems, thus 
increasing efficiency.  
To use a fishing metaphor, ILP allows the agency to stop fishing by throwing out 
a wide net to catch single fish hidden among the school, and instead to start using a fish 
finder, putting the hook in front of the right fish. By studying the strategy canvas for ILP 
and using the four actions framework, police executives should identify units or positions 
that do not contribute to the core missions identified by the chief, and reassign those 
officers to the areas of greatest need. As seen in the Nashville and Chicago case studies, 
these important functions include increasing the intelligence analysis function and 
providing additional officers for targeted policing efforts. This increased efficiency and 
internal resource trading to reinforce the chief’s priorities help to jump the resource 
hurdle. Nashville was able to implement ADL and achieve crime reductions not only 
within resources, but during a time when the number of officers actually declined.150 
Motivational Hurdle—The third challenge to implementation is motivational. 
The leader cannot implement change alone, and needs key players in the organization to 
move with speed and energy to break from traditional policing to ILP. Once the key 
players in the police agency recognize the need for change and understand that ILP is an 
efficient policing model, they need to be motivated to act on the chief’s priorities in a 
meaningful and sustained manner.  
The nature of ILP as implemented in Nashville and Chicago facilitated motivation 
because it utilized three motivational factors necessary to support such a change.151 
Rather than try to motivate everyone en masse, the chief should focus on the individuals 
with the greatest ability to influence others in the organization. Kim & Mauborgne call 
these internal leaders kingpins who are well respected and persuasive in the organization. 
In Nashville, the chief did this by sending copies of his issue paper to commanders before 
he arrived, and then empowering district commanders to initiate the change. In Chicago, 
                                                 
150 Serpas, Presentation to Public Safety Committee. 
151 Kim and Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy, 161-165.  
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the DOC was given resources and authority and pilot districts were selected to initiate the 
change. Thus, both leaders identified district commanders as kingpins with the ability to 
exert great influence in the organization. 
The efforts of these internal leaders should be highlighted so that their actions or 
inactions are visible for all to see, as if in a fishbowl.152  This motivates the leaders to 
succeed and improves the chances of others joining the efforts. The DOC meetings in 
Chicago and Compstat meetings in Nashville serve to place the efforts of these leaders in 
the spotlight, and give commanders a platform to showcase their successes. If success 
breeds success, then other commanders are motivated to match or beat the success of 
their peers.  
Finally, initiating such a large strategic shift in an organization can be threatening 
and stressful for employees. This fear can prevent some from taking action, and internal 
communications are important to manage this effect. Employees can be helped by 
breaking down the larger strategy into smaller “bites” that address the mission of a unit or 
area. Rather than try to grapple with the effort necessary to achieve the entire agency’s 
mission, officers and supervisors are more likely to believe that they can achieve a more 
limited mission statement crafted for a smaller segment of the organization. For example, 
if a unit understands that their objective is to make several city blocks safer, they may 
perceive that as obtainable, whereas they might feel intimidated if they tried to grasp the 
larger mission of securing the entire city. 
Political Hurdle—The last hurdle is internal politics. Change does not come 
easily to an organization, and it is often resisted by employees with an interest in 
maintaining the status quo. This is perhaps the most difficult challenge. The police 
executive needs to have a senior leader on his staff who can advise him on the potential 
supporters and opponents of his strategy. The executive needs to understand the nature of 
the opponents’ arguments and attempt to build win-win solutions to their arguments. 
Highlighting and rewarding the positive performance of those who embrace the new 
strategy is an important step. 
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actions or inactions of subordinate leaders. 
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3. Other Issues 
Once an executive determines that the agency will implement a strategic shift to 
ILP, and negotiates the issues outlined above to determine the shape and direction of that 
change, the chief and his management team will have myriad other technical issues to 
manage. It is the purpose of this research paper to identify and offer recommendations on 
strategic issues related to a transition to intelligence-led policing, not to be a technical 
reference guide. Resources are available to law enforcement executives that provide 
guidance on some of the more technical issues. Several issues are discussed in this 
section to be illustrative of the issues and provide some resources to help address them. 
Training—To establish the intelligence capacity needed for law enforcement 
operations and to identify threats in the community from criminals and terrorists, officers, 
analysts, and managers need training and education. They also need sufficient experience 
to gain sophistication and skill in ILP techniques.153 There are adequate guidance 
documents and many schools and training courses available to help agencies determine 
the type of training that they need and to help them obtain it. 
Every member of the law enforcement agency should participate in some form of 
training to facilitate the implementation of ILP. Training for non-intelligence personnel, 
including recruits, patrol officers, and investigators should aim to help them better 
understand the intelligence process and their role in that process. This is designed to 
prepare them to understand, contribute to, and benefit from intelligence.154 Analyst 
training should improve domain awareness and preparing local threat assessments. The 
subject matter of intelligence training for analytical staff can be divided into two 
categories: (1) protocols and methodology of intelligence process, and (2) subject matter 
expertise.155 The former deals with the administrative issues of managing an intelligence 
unit, and the latter deals with knowledge of the types of enterprise they are investigating: 
drug trafficking, international terrorism, Islamic jihad, auto theft, money laundering, 
gangs, etc. The intelligence specialist must be a subject matter expert on the type of 
                                                 
153 Riley, et al., State and Local Intelligence, 61. 
154 Marilyn B. Peterson and Howard N. Atkin, “Training the Intelligence Unit” in Peterson, ed., 
Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements. 
155 Carter, Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide, 112. 
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criminal activity investigated. A major recommendation of the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan was for increased training and standardization.156 Minimum 
criminal intelligence training standards have been developed which provide standardized 
curriculum.157 The standards outline core minimum criminal intelligence training 
standards for each of several training classifications, including intelligence analyst (40 
hours), intelligence manager (24 hours), law enforcement executive (4 hours), general 
law enforcement officer (recruit 2 hours/in service 2 hours), intelligence officer/collector 
(40 hours), and train-the-trainer (16 hours). 
28CFR Part 23—The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan recommends 
that law enforcement agencies should adopt the requirements of 28CFR Part 23 as the 
minimum standards for their data collection efforts. This federal regulation establishes 
criminal intelligence systems operating policies, and though it legally applies to federally 
funded multi-jurisdictional computerized criminal intelligence systems, the 
recommendation of the NCISP is sound for all agencies to adopt its requirements. The 
regulations provide guidance on critical issues such as the collection of information, 
retention of records, established process of records review, purging standards and 
processes, and dissemination criteria.  
Non law enforcement inclusion—It has been argued here and in a number of 
other places that local law enforcement agencies are well situated to participate in the war 
on terrorism because of their close ties to the community. For similar reasons, it is 
important to incorporate non law enforcement disciplines into the intelligence process. 
Firefighters, EMS, public health, and other emergency response agencies interact with the 
public every day. In the course of their responses, they are in a position to observe 
suspicious activity and indicators of criminal or terrorist activity. Additionally, as they 
respond in these neighborhoods, they place themselves in potentially dangerous 
situations. A response by a local fire company or ambulance crew to a residence where 
terrorist suspects are housed presents a potentially dangerous situation.  
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Public Health is another example of a non law enforcement discipline with a 
wealth of potential information for law enforcement. Health officials monitor health 
outbreaks and emergency medical responses, and should have a mechanism to report 
information to analysts. Private sector security personnel also have the potential to serve 
as important “eyes and ears” for law enforcement, but they must first understand what to 
look for and how to report. As law enforcement develops the capacity to understand 
threats from criminals and terrorists, they must understand the importance of sharing 
outside of law enforcement circles. The value of an informed responder and security 
force comes from their interactions in the community and ability to observe and report 
important information. As they do so and interact with terrorists or their tools, it becomes 
imperative that law enforcement use the intelligence they have developed to educate 
these responders so that they have the knowledge to protect themselves as they serve the 
public. Recent research highlights this need and provides potential solutions for providing 
intelligence to non law enforcement personnel in an appropriate context.158 Eaneff 
provides a model of dissemination to non law enforcement personnel that can increase 
awareness and sharing and result in improved intelligence. 
Unfortunately, while this need is increasingly acknowledged, the ability to bridge 
this gap and provide relevant intelligence to non-traditional responders is hampered by 
both inadequate process and unwillingness by law enforcement officials.159 For example, 
due to its interpretation of Indiana law regulating criminal intelligence information, the 
Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC) considers any information that comes into its 
possession as criminal intelligence information and will not disseminate it except to law 
enforcement agencies.160 This may be an example of the law being outpaced by the needs 
                                                 
158 Charles Eaneff, The Impact of Contextual Background Fusion on Perceived Value and Quality of 
Unclassified Terrorism Intelligence, (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 
2007), 11. 
159 Eaneff uses the term “Non Traditional Responder” (NTR) to describe the non law enforcement 
public safety personnel, security forces, and critical infrastructure operators. Eaneff acknowledges the 
important role the NTR sector can play in collecting information and intelligence generation, as well as the 
importance of disseminating intelligence to them in the proper context so that they can effectively carry out 
their protective missions. Eaneff argues that the NTR generally neither need nor want classified 
intelligence, rather, to be useful, they need declassified intelligence in the context of their mission.  
160 This assessment is based on conversations with the executive director of the Indiana Intelligence 
Fusion Center that took place in January 2007. The Director acknowledges the importance of sharing with 
NTR’s, but feels constrained by Indiana code and inadequate mechanisms to do so. 
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of information sharing in today’s world. It also highlights the importance of 
understanding the need to share information, and adjusting laws and policies to 
accomplish critical needs. 
Resources—Resources are available to provide law enforcement managers 
guidance on the technical aspects of implementing ILP. While not meant to be a complete 
listing, several of them are:   
• The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan:161  The NCISP serves 
as a reference guide providing guidance on establishing an intelligence 
function.   
• Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies:162 The Guide provides an overview of intelligence 
and detailed technical information on establishing intelligence units. It is 
current and addresses important management issues. 
• Intelligence 2000: Revising the Basic Elements:163 Intelligence 2000 is a 
detailed primer on law enforcement intelligence. It provides an overview 
of the intelligence function as well as very detailed information on how to 
implement and manage an intelligence unit. 
• Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards164 The standards 
provide standardized curriculum on law enforcement intelligence training. 
Agencies could immediately adopt these standards and improve their 
capabilities. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter began with a discussion of the Chicago and Nashville models of ILP 
as applied to the 3i model presented in Chapter II. This analysis validates the elements of 
the 3i model, and identifies several other elements necessary for a successful ILP 
program. This analysis supports the notion that agencies have to focus both on structure 
and policy to develop an effective ILP program. To develop ILP capacity, an agency 
must structure itself and establish policies to collect, develop, and use intelligence. In a  
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164 U.S. Department of Justice, Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards. 
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shift from the reactive culture of traditional policing models, ILP requires that the agency 
institutionalize the intelligence cycle in every aspect of their operation to take a proactive 
stance against identified threats. 
A discussion followed of considerations for police executives in moving an 
agency to an ILP strategy. The Four Actions framework provides leaders with a tool to 
challenge current operations and develop recommendations for organizational elements 
that should be reduced, increased, eliminated, or created in order to achieve the strategic 
shift. Considering the discussion of critical elements for ILP adoption, the Four Action 
Framework was presented with these factors applied to a non specific agency. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of potential barriers to implementation of ILP in an 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. PREVENT TERRORISM WITH ILP 
The threat of domestic and international terrorism to cause widespread property 
damage, pain, human suffering, injury, and death is a real concern in America and 
throughout the Western world. The recently updated National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism describes today’s terrorist enemy as a “transnational movement of 
organizations, networks, and individuals—and their state and non-state supporters— 
which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for their ideological 
ends.”165  
Add the threat of terrorist acts posed by domestic groups and it is apparent that 
the challenge of preventing terrorism in America is large indeed. Public safety agencies 
cannot rely solely on federal law enforcement for their protection. As local crime 
problems continue to demand increasing attention and resources, the challenge to police 
executives is to squeeze the counter terrorism mission into the jobs their agencies 
perform. ILP is presented as an option to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of law 
enforcement in identifying and reducing the threat of crime in the community, potentially 
without the burden of adding additional resources.  
1. Integrate Counter Terrorism and Crime Prevention Activities 
The same model of intelligence-led policing that can develop an understanding of 
criminal trends and issues in the community can be effective at identifying, 
understanding, and assessing the terrorist threat. This is made possible because terrorist 
planning activity often manifests itself through other criminal activity, exposing it to 
observation and analysis by the police. Similarly, an engaged community can observe and 
report suspicious activity, providing information for analysts to consider. In spite of the 
fact that much of the classified intelligence on the presence of terrorist groups in America 
is held by federal law enforcement officials, mechanisms exist to bridge the gap. These 
include Joint Terrorism Task Forces and State Fusion Centers. Neither JTTFs nor Fusion 
Centers, however, have the capacity to engage the community like local police agencies.    
                                                 
165 White House, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington, DC, September 2006), 9. 
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Law enforcement agencies, therefore, should implement intelligence-led policing to 
improve their ability to combat crime and to improve their ability to protect their 
communities against terrorism. They alone possess the means to develop a deep 
understanding of the character and issues of their communities. 
2. Develop Analytic Sophistication for Terrorism Analysis 
For analysts to generate intelligence about crime trends and threats in the 
community, they need training in the mechanics of intelligence as well as education to 
become subject matter experts in crime type(s). With sufficient training, when they study 
collected information, they are able to discern patterns of activity and behavior indicative 
of a particular crime.  
The same process should be used to develop the capacity for analysts to identify 
terrorist activity in a community. This is no simple task, but it is critical for law 
enforcement executives to facilitate the development of this base of knowledge among 
their intelligence analysts. Analysts need training, education, and experience to 
understand terrorists, terrorist groups, their motivations, and actions, so that when they 
study behavior patterns, they will be able to make sense of behavior and reach correct 
assumptions. If they can develop the sophistication and expertise to develop deep 
understanding of their local communities, analysts within local police agencies are well 
situated to understand whether the behavior and activities they are analyzing are within 
local norms or truly constitute threatening behaviors. This can happen as a result of the 
closer ties to the community enjoyed by local police. 
3. Embrace Community Policing 
Adopting a community policing philosophy that values community partnerships 
has been an important strategy for improving the responsiveness and accountability of 
police. The trust built through close community ties facilitates increased information 
sharing necessary for intelligence-led policing. Citizens willing to report criminal activity 
can interrupt an otherwise unnoticed criminal enterprise. These same strengths contribute 
to interrupting terrorists organizations operating in the neighborhoods of our cities.  
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Community policing efforts that engage communities and build relationships and 
understanding with citizens should serve as the foundation upon which intelligence-led 
policing strategies are built. 
B. BUILD ILP CAPACITY ALONG STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS 
This paper’s analysis and conclusions have identified the important strategic 
elements for developing an effective intelligence-led policing program in a law 
enforcement agency. The following recommendations draw upon the conclusions of that 
analysis and establish a framework for agencies to follow in developing and 
implementing an ILP program.  
1. Use the 3i Model as an Effective Framework 
The six elements of the 3i model serve as key aspects of an effective program. 
The model is sufficiently flexible to allow development of a strategy that meets local 
needs and issues while developing an effective ILP program. Police executives should 
evaluate the structure and operations of their organization and cause changes to ensure 
the structure, policies, and processes align with the tenets of the 3i model.  
2. Centralize Intelligence and Analysis 
An effective intelligence structure provides the foundation for the rest of the 3i 
model to work. This thesis has shown that to be most effective, departments should create 
or reinforce a robust centralized intelligence operation. The main role of this unit should 
be the identification and analysis of major threats and trends, with minor investigative 
emphasis. The work of this unit should be of central importance to the operations of the 
department, and should have the full support of the chief executive. 
3. Develop Comprehensive, Organized Collection Efforts 
Accurate, targeted, and timely intelligence analysis is made possible in large part 
by ensuring that analysts have as much relevant information as possible from as many 
sources as possible. An agency that wishes to have an effective ILP program must ensure 
that information from the widest possible array of internal and external sources is made 
available to the intelligence analysts. 
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4.  Consider Whole Jurisdiction as Focus for Crime Strategies 
The benefits of establishing an aggressive, sophisticated central intelligence 
analytical capability are seen in the ability to identify and understand complex crime 
trends and threats, while improving neighborhood-level efforts. Agencies will realize the 
most benefit from implementing ILP if they require a jurisdiction-wide assessment of 
problems. More localized problems will develop as a subset of these larger problems, and 
agencies will be more effective at eradicating threats if this broader perspective is taken. 
5. Build Accountability for Results at All Levels 
Even the most accurate and insightful intelligence is useless if no one pays 
attention to it. For an agency to achieve the crime reduction benefits made possible by 
improved intelligence, it must be utilized in operational decisions. Police executives must 
implement a mechanism by which intelligence is shared and discussed in relation to 
threats and operational activities. Intelligence must be the basis by which accountability 
for the success of operations is measured. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Integration with State and Federal Intelligence Sources 
This report has demonstrated that the ability to create a capacity within a law 
enforcement agency to develop, understand, and act upon intelligence is challenging but 
possible when the chief executive makes it his or her priority. The model presented in this 
paper does require law enforcement agencies to organize and dedicate resources to break 
from former patterns of operation and to institutionalize and facilitate new patterns. The 
intelligence development activities described in this paper do require personnel dedicated 
to the necessary functions, thus this model may be impractical for smaller agencies to 
implement. The examples of Chicago and Metro Nashville police departments used in 
this paper are large police departments with over a thousand personnel. Reorganization 
and restructuring of personnel within agencies of that size should make personnel 
available to dedicate to the necessary intelligence structure. It is recognized that smaller 
agencies may not be able to reallocate sufficient personnel to establish a full-service  
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intelligence unit in the agency. Though their need for accurate, timely intelligence about 
threats and conditions in their jurisdiction is no less real, the manpower issue is a real 
barrier.  
Further research is required to develop a model for intelligence-led policing 
among smaller agencies. If all resources in smaller agencies are focused on operational 
activities, there remains a need to create the full intelligence structure in the agency. This 
need may be met in partnership between the agency and a state or regional Fusion Center. 
Fusion centers provide collection ability, analytical resources, and are increasingly 
equipped to disseminate intelligence products in real time to law enforcement 
agencies.166  Fusion Centers are supposed to serve as a conduit for information and 
intelligence flow between local, state, and federal sources. This is an important role, but 
to truly provide value to local agencies the Fusion Center must understand local priorities 
and requirements in order to provide the local agency with relevant intelligence in the 
local context.  
For a Fusion Center to develop the ability to support police agencies with the kind 
of sophisticated intelligence about criminal and terrorist threats in a specific community 
would require close collaboration between the agency head and the Fusion Center. The 
Fusion Center would have to accept local agency priorities and allow them to drive the 
intelligence requirements of their analysis. There would be certain challenges to ensuring 
that the intelligence truly supported the needs of the local agency if a Fusion Center 
provided their intelligence. Fusion Centers would likely have to expand the scope of their 
collection and analysis, thus losing some autonomy over their mission. Their focus would 
have to expand from a primarily terrorism focus to one that includes all crimes, as 
established by their agency partners. The needs of smaller agencies for quality 
intelligence should justify this expansion of the Fusion Center role. Additionally, the 
justification for such continued spending at current levels on Fusion Centers should be 
linked to its effectiveness in reducing threats from both terrorism and crime in 
communities.  Further research should examine the role and function of Fusion Centers 
and study how they might improve their relevance to local law enforcement issues. 
                                                 
166 U.S. Department of Justice, “Executive Summary,” Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and 
Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: Office of Justice Programs)   
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2. ILP Effectiveness Metrics 
As police agencies attempt to become more effective at reducing threats of crime 
and terrorism in their communities, police chiefs and commanders need to have methods 
and processes available to them to assess the effectiveness of their efforts. The difficulty 
of ascribing causation to crime fighting efforts was discussed in earlier chapters. Police 
executives generally do not need statistically significant scientific findings of 
effectiveness of their efforts, however. When trying to apply the most effective police 
tactics to problems identified through the ILP process, police commanders need to have 
the means to assess whether a tactic has worked or not so that they can continue it or 
adjust to other tactics. Further research into this issue should attempt to develop tools and 
skills for use by commanders and analysts to assess whether identified threats are reduced 
after law enforcement intervention.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Law enforcement agencies are constantly challenged by a changing threat 
environment, and attempt to meet the challenges with the resources they have at hand. In 
the past twenty years, terrorism has emerged as a dangerous threat to America while 
community expectations to address crime have grown as well. Americans rely on local, 
state, and federal law enforcement to understand this threat, and to incorporate counter 
terrorism efforts into their already full missions. In looking for the best means to 
understand and combat the threat of terrorism, intelligence-led policing has been offered 
as an effective strategy to improve police effectiveness. Several models of policing have 
been developed that integrate aspects of intelligence-led policing into an agency’s 
strategy. This paper has studied the ILP practices of two police departments—Nashville 
and Chicago—and analyzed the elements of their strategies that contribute to successful 
ILP. Drawing from the 3i model of effective ILP operations, this analysis validates the 
elements of the 3i model, and identifies several others as critical strategic elements 
necessary for an agency to develop and implement a successful ILP strategy.  
A framework to understand and apply the elements of the ILP strategy is provided 
to understand how police executives can evaluate their own operations and develop a 
strategy to implement ILP in their own agency. This evaluation is critical, because as this 
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research has demonstrated, structure, processes, policies, and executive direction do 
matter, and properly implemented ILP can make a tremendous difference in the 
effectiveness and the efficiency with which police identify and address threats in their 
communities. This thesis has advanced the body of knowledge related to defining and 
improving the abilities of law enforcement to effectively contribute in the global war on 
terrorism. Future research will build on the results of this thesis and identify issues and 
provide solutions for homeland security practitioners. The security and safety of our 
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